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1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Owing to the growth of the Internet and spread of globalization, the economic
environment surrounding firms has changed dramatically over the past few
decades. The development of e-commerce and third-party logistics firms such
as UPS and Federal Express has made it easier for manufacturers to sell their
products to consumers directly. Indeed, many prominent manufacturers such
as Apple, Cisco Systems, Daimler, Eastman Kodak, Estee Lauder, Hewlett-
Packard, IBM, Lenovo, Nike, and Pioneer Electronics have opened Internet
channels in addition to traditional retail channels to sell products to consumers
(Tsay and Agrawal, 2004a, 2004b). However, as multichannel distribution
strategies have become widespread, manufacturers now face many challenges
related to distribution channels including conflicts and coordination between
existing channels and new direct channels within a firm aswell as inter-channel
competition. In addition, the spread of globalization has made it easier for var-
ious sellers to trade across countries and regions. Therefore, manufacturers
face a situation wherein their products are sold outside their own supply chain,
which is called gray market trade. KPMG (2008) reports that losses due to gray
market trade amount to $ 58 billion in the information technology industry.
Supply chain management strategies in various economic environments are
expanding. Especially in the fields of operations research and management
science, many previous studies examine a firm’s supply chain management
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using mathematical models.
Seminalworks that analyze possible inter-channel conflicts between existing
channels and newly established direct channels in a single manufacturer’s sup-
ply chain includeChiang et al. (2003), Tsay andAgrawal (2004a), andCai (2010).
Chiang et al. (2003) analyze the price competition between a manufacturer and
its traditional retailer, showing that the introduction of direct sales is ecient
for both the manufacturer and the retailer. They explain that the avoidance of
double marginalization makes the manufacturer ecient, while the reduction
in the wholesale price makes the retailer ecient. Tsay and Agrawal (2004a)
also investigate whether channel conflicts occur between a manufacturer with
a direct channel and a traditional retailer. They show that the introduction of
a direct channel in addition to a retail channel does not necessarily harmful
the retailer as long as the manufacturer properly adjusts its pricing. Cai (2010)
assumes four dierent supply chain structures and investigates the impact of
the structures on the members of supply chains. He states that introducing a
direct sales channel can be Pareto ecient with or without cooperation among
supply chain members. Thus, prior studies of conflicts within the supply chain
of a single manufacturer generally conclude that the introduction of a direct
sales channel is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailers.
Some studies extend the discussion to investigate the strategic eects of di-
rect sales channels when multiple manufacturers compete. Chen et al. (2013)
investigate the price competition between one manufacturer that sells products
via both retail and direct channels and another manufacturer that sells prod-
ucts via only the same retail channel. They note that improving brand loyalty is
beneficial to both manufacturers and the retailer and that an increased service
value can mitigate the threat of direct channel on the retailer and increase the
manufacturer’s profit. This dissertation contributes to the academic develop-
ment of these fields by examining the strategic eects in a dual-channel supply
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chain.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2,
we show that when two symmetrical manufacturers choose their distribution
channels, an asymmetrical combination of distribution channels arises as an
equilibrium in the presence of a product space. InChapter 3, we show thatwhen
two symmetrical manufacturers choose their supply chain strategies in two
dimensions, that is, distribution channels and exclusive territories, an exclusive
territory strategy can be an optimal strategy for manufacturers. In Chapter 4,
we show that setting a selling price after competitors can be an optimal strategy
for multinational firms dealing with gray market trade.
Summaries of the chapters are provided in the next section.
1.2 Summary of the analysis
Chapter 2 investigates a dual-channel supply chainmanagement problem in the
presence of a product space, that is often used to discuss product dierentiation.
Specifically, we assume that two symmetrical manufacturers can sell products
via the retail channel only, thedirect channel only, or both the retail and thedirect
channels. Our model shows that asymmetrical distribution strategies, that is,
one manufacturer using both the retail and the direct channels, with the other
using only the direct channel, are generated as an equilibrium. In addition,
the equilibrium asymmetrical distribution strategies are Pareto ecient for
manufacturers. This new result provides a managerial implication for firms
facing the dual-channel supply chain management problem.
Chapter 3 investigates a supply chain management problem concerning
whether a manufacturer should apply exclusive sales territories when it can
distribute products through dual-channel supply chains comprising not only
retail but also direct channels. Specifically, we consider a case that each of two
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competing manufacturers that sell their products in two regions through dual
channels chooses whether to grant local monopolies to retailers that deal in
the manufacturer’s brand in an exclusive territory. We first demonstrate that
even when a manufacturer can use the direct channel to sell products to end
consumers, there exist circumstances in which the adoption of exclusive ter-
ritories in the retail channel is the optimal strategy for the manufacturer and
hence increases its profit. A notable result from our analysis is that when a
manufacturer can use dual channels as in our model, the adoption of exclusive
territories can boost its profit even if the products are more dierentiated be-
tween manufacturers than when the manufacturer can use only a single retail
channel. These results are new and provide useful insights for manufacturers
that need to simultaneously cope with the two types of distribution policies:
exclusive territories and dual-channel supply chain management.
Chapter 4 investigates the problem of timing for firms that must cope with
graymarket trade in setting their selling prices using an observable delay game
framework established in non-cooperative game theory. We consider a case in
which a multinational firm (MNF) sells a specific product in two countries, and
a parallel importer (PI) buys a certain amount of the product in one country
and resells it in the other country. Our model shows that the MNF never sets
its price at the same time as the PI sets its price in equilibrium and that the
MNF’s optimal pricing timing depends on the degree of consumer preference
for product quality in the market in which the MNF deals with gray market
trade. Specifically, when the dierence in the preference for product quality is
relatively large among consumers, the MNF should set its price before the PI
sets its price, while when the dierence in the preference for product quality
is relatively small, the MNF should set its price after the PI sets its price in
equilibrium. This result is new and provides a managerial implication for firms
that must cope with gray market trade.
2
Asymmetrical product distribution
between manufacturers in the presence of
a product space
2.1 Introduction
The growth of the Internet in recent years has increased the opportunities for
manufacturers to sell directly to consumers. This has made it necessary for
manufacturers to implement ecient supply chain management. Therefore,
focusing on supply chain management, we investigate the problem of the dis-
tribution channel choices confronted by manufacturers that can sell products
using both retail and direct channels. In particular, we introduce a product
space, which is often used to discuss product dierentiation, into our model.
The main result of this chapter is that asymmetrical distribution strategies, that
is, one manufacturer using both the retail and the direct channel with the other
using only the direct channel, are naturally generated as an equilibrium, even
among manufacturers with completely symmetrical conditions. In addition,
when introducing the product space, the equilibrium distribution strategies
are Pareto ecient for manufacturers, regardless of the circumstances given
exogenously. This new result contributes to the literature on this subject.
Since direct sales by manufacturers now play a more important role in
various consumer goods categories, a number of prior studies examine math-
5
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ematical models in which manufacturers eciently manage dual distribution
channels, that is, both the retail and the direct channels. Matsui (2016) is closely
related to the model presented in this chapter. He investigates the problem of
multiple competing symmetric manufacturers choosing a distribution channel,
and shows that asymmetrical distribution strategies occur as an equilibrium
between symmetrical manufacturers. However, his study does not consider a
brand position in the product space. By contrast, our model considers brand
positioning and shows that asymmetrical distribution strategies occur as an
equilibrium in the product space of the brands provided by multiple compet-
ing manufacturers.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents a
review of the literature related to dual-channel supply chain management. Sec-
tion 2.3 provides the basic assumption of our models, and Section 2.4 analyzes
our model and shows its results and implications. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
Many prior studies of coordination or conflict between traditional retailers and
direct sales using mathematical models have been published in operational
research and management science journals. In particular, many studies focus
on the ecient management of two types of distribution channels, direct sales
and retailing (e.g., Balasubramanian, 1998; Chiang et al., 2003; Yao and Liu,
2003; Tsay and Agrawal, 2004a, 2004b; Chiang and Monahan, 2005; Yao et al.,
2005; Cattani et al., 2006; Kurata et al., 2007; Bernstein et al., 2008; Dumrongsiri
et al., 2008; Mukhopadhyay et al., 2008; Huang and Swaminathan, 2009; Cai,
2010; Chiang, 2010; Hua et al., 2010, Khouja and Wang, 2010; Xu and Zhao,
2010; Chen et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Hsiao and Chen, 2013; Cao, 2014;
David and Adida, 2015; Li et al., 2015; Rodriguez and Aydin, 2015; Matsui,
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2016; Liu et al., 2016). Yao and Liu (2003) develop a dynamic diusion model to
investigate themanufacturer’s best choice of channeldistribution strategy. They
provide a condition when each channel strategy, namely, entirely switching to
the direct channel, keeping both channels, or remaining in the oine channel,
can benefit the manufacturer. Kurata et al. (2007) examine a channel pricing
in a dual-channels under competition between a national-brand firm that can
sell through both retail and direct channels and a store-brand firm which can
sell only thorough the same retail channel. They find that an increase in brand
value can be beneficial to both firms and that the national-brand firm is more
restricted than the store-brand firm in choosing its marketing strategy. Hsiao
andChen (2013) propose a theoreticalmodel to examine the competition among
two manufacturers and a retailer. They show that asymmetrical distribution
channel structure can occur as a result of manufacturers’ strategic choices and
that the condition under which this structure occurs depends on the degree of
horizontal dierentiation between brands and channels.
2.3 Model and assumptions
Table 2.1 lists the variables in our model and Fig. 2.1 describes the market
and structure of supply chains. To simplify the analysis, we suppose that the
product space is not multidimensional, but a one-dimensional straight line.
To capture this product space, we use the Hotelling model. Suppose that
consumers are uniformly distributed in the product space at density d. As
shown in Fig. 2.1, we assume that two manufacturers, Manufacturer 1 and
Manufacturer 2, produce horizontally dierentiated products and sell them to
consumers. Each manufacturer produces a product with marginal cost c and
no fixed cost. Manufacturers can distribute their products through two types
of distribution channels. One is a retail channel, meaning that products are
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Table 2.1: Notation
Notation
p Retail price or direct price
q Quantity
Q Quantity
r Wholesale price
c Marginal cost of production
b Gross benefit of consumption
t Disutility parameter from the deviation of consumers’ preferred
location from the brand location.
x Location of consumer preference
d Density of consumers
i Subscript that denotes the brand, manufacturer, or retailer (i =
1; 2)
j Subscript that denotes the other brand, manufacturer, or retailer
( j , i)
xi Location of the brand i (i = 1; 2)
 Profit for a manufacturer
 Profit for a retailer
B b + 2t (x2   x1)
 t=d
V d fb + 2t (x2   x1)   cg2 =t
R Strategy of selling products only through the retail channel
D Strategy of selling products only through the direct channel
RD Strategy of selling products through both the retail and the direct
channels
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Figure 2.1: Supply chain structure
distributed through a traditional retailer, and the other is a direct distribution
channel, meaning that products are sold directly to consumers. Suppose that
each product is dierentiated as a brand regardless of the distribution channel.
In other words, Manufacturer 1 supplies brand 1 and Manufacturer 2 supplies
brand 2. In the product space, we assume that brand 1 is located at x1 and brand
2 is located at x2. We assume x1 < x2 without loss of generality.
We assume that each manufacturer chooses from the following three distri-
bution strategies. Under “Strategy R,” the manufacturer distributes products
using the retail channel only. Under “Strategy D,” the manufacturer distributes
products using the direct channel only. Finally, under “Strategy RD,” the man-
ufacturer distributes products using both the retail and the direct channels.
Suppose the utility function of consumers located at x on the product space
when they purchase the product of brand i is as follows:
ui = b   pi   4tjxi   xj; (2.1)
where b is the gross benefit from purchasing a product, pi is the price of brand i,
and 4tjxi   xj is the term of disutility resulting from the deviation of consumers’
preferred location x from brand i’s location xi. Suppose that the gross benefit is
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suciently high so that b > c+6t (x2   x1) holds. This inequality guarantees that
consumers in [x1; x2] always purchase a product of either brand. Let xˆ denote
the location of consumers who are indierent between brand 1’s product and
brand 2’s product. Then, the following equation is satisfied:
xˆ =
x1 + x2
2
+
p2   p1
8t
(2.2)
Wedefine x as the locationof the last consumerswhopurchase brand1’s product
given that Manufacturer 1 captures consumers to the left side of the product
space. Similarly, we define x as the location of the last consumers who purchase
brand 2’s product given that Manufacturer 2 captures consumers to the right
side of the product space. It follows that
x = x1   b   p14t ; (2.3)
x = x2 +
b   p2
4t
: (2.4)
From Equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4), the demand functions for each brand
are as follows:
Q1 = d

xˆ   x

= d
(
x2   x1
2
+
p2   p1
8t
+
b   p1
4t
)
; (2.5)
Q2 = d (x   xˆ) = d
(
x2   x1
2
+
p1   p2
8t
+
b   p2
4t
)
: (2.6)
Solving Equations (2.5) and (2.6) for prices p1 and p2 yields the following inverse
demand functions:
p1 = b + 2t (x2   x1)   t (3Q1 +Q2)d ; (2.7)
p2 = b + 2t (x2   x1)   t (Q1 + 3Q2)d : (2.8)
To simplify the notations of the model, we define two variables,   t=d and
B  b + 2t (x2   x1), and delete five variables, namely t, d, b, x1, and x2. From
Equations (2.7) and (2.8), we rewrite the inverse demand functions as follows:
p1 = B    (3Q1 +Q2) ; (2.9)
p2 = B    (Q1 + 3Q2) : (2.10)
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We then define qRi as the quantity of brand i distributed by Manufacturer i
through the retail channel and qDi as the quantity of brand i distributed by
Manufacturer i through the direct channel. The following equation holds under
the condition that supply and demand are equal:
Qi = qRi + q
D
i : (2.11)
The profits of Manufacturer i, i, which distributes products in the retail
channel only, in the direct channel only, and in both the retail and the direct
channels, respectively are as follows:
i = (ri   c) qRi ; (2.12)
i =

pD   c

qDi ; (2.13)
i = (ri   c) qRi +

pD   c

qDi ; (2.14)
where ri is the wholesale price of the product sold by Manufacturer i, pRi is the
retail price of brand i’s product, and pDi is the direct price of brand i’s product.
The profit of Retailer i is
i =

pRi   ri

qRi : (2.15)
Following Cai (2010), who constructs a typical dual-channel supply chain
mathematical model, we assume the timeline of our model shown in Fig. 2.2.
Each manufacturer first determines its supply chain strategy (i.e., Strategy R,
D, or RD) in Stage 1. Then, a manufacturer that distributes products through
a retail channel sets the wholesale price ri and sells the product to a retailer in
Stage 2. Finally, price competition arises in Stage 3; the retail price, pDi or p
R
i ,
is determined either by the manufacturer that distributes products through the
direct channel or by the retailer in the retail channel used by the manufacturer.
We adopt a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) as the equilibrium con-
cept because we construct our model based on the framework of a dynamic
game of complete information. We solve the game by backward induction to
identify the SPNE.
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Figure 2.2: Timeline of events
2.4 Analysis
Based on the assumptions presented in the previous section, we derive man-
ufacturers’ payos for each pair of distribution strategies, as the next lemma
shows. (The Appendix provides all proofs.)
Lemma 2.1. Table 2.2 shows the equilibrium payos of the manufacturers for
each set of distribution strategies. In Table 2.2, we define the variable V =
d fb + 2t (x2   x1)   cg2 =t.
The payo matrix in Table 2.2 summarizes the payos when each manu-
facturer sets Strategies R, D, and RD. By comparing these payos, we identify
the equilibrium pair of distribution strategies in Stage 1, as summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. The pairs of distribution strategies that are always generated
as the SPNE regardless of the exogenous parameter values are Strategies (D,
RD) and (RD, D).
Proposition 2.1 is themost important result in this chapter. It shows that one
manufacturer distributes products using both the retail and the direct channels,
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Table 2.2: Payomatrix
M2
R D RD
R
 357
9610
V;
357
9610
V
  21
680
V;
4107
57800
V
  1681
53868
V;
1275
17956
V

[0:03715V; 0:03715V] [0:03088V; 0:07106V] [0:03121V; 0:07101V]
M1 D
 4107
57800
V;
21
680
V
  3
50
V;
3
50
V
 



 1681
27744
V;
49
816
V

[0:07106V; 0:03088V] [0:06V; 0:06V] [0:06509V; 0:06005V]
RD
 1275
12956
V;
1681
53868
V
 



 49
816
V;
1681
27744
V
  3
50
V;
3
50
V

[0:07101V; 0:03121V] [0:06005V; 0:06059V] [0:06V; 0:06V]
Notes: M1 and M2 represent Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2, respectively. The
payo for Manufacturer 1 is the first value in each parenthesis, while the payo for
Manufacturer 2 is the second value in each parenthesis. The circled payos represent
the Nash equilibria of our model.
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whereas the other manufacturer distributes products using the direct channel
only in equilibrium. In other words, although the combination of the man-
ufacturer and retailer is symmetrical, an asymmetrical distribution channel
structure arises in equilibrium. Furthermore, the following corollary is derived
from Proposition 2.1.
Corollary 2.1. In the asymmetrical distribution strategies of either Strategy (RD,
D) or Strategy (D, RD), the profit of the manufacturer that distributes products
using the direct channel only (i.e., Strategy D) is always greater than that of
the manufacturer that distributes products using both the retail and the direct
channels (i.e., Strategy RD).
We now provide the intuition behind Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 2.1. Gal-
Or (1985) shows that a firmwith later pricing has a higher profit than a firmwith
earlier pricing under price competition. This advantage of later pricing is called
the second-mover advantage, which provides competing firms with as much
incentive as possible to set their prices at a later time. Then, the situation where
their prices are determined at the same timing is unstable. Furthermore, van
Damme and Hurkens (2004) extend the findings of Gal-Or (1985) and find that
if price competition occurs, competing firms earn higher profits when setting
their prices sequentially rather than at the same time under a wide range of
circumstances. In our model, when Manufacturer i adopts Strategy RD, both
the retail price pRi and the direct price p
D
i are equal to the wholesale price ri
because of the homogeneous Bertrand competition between channels, that is,
ri = pRi = p
D
i is derived, as evidenced in the Appendix. Since the selling prices
are equal to the wholesale price, adopting Strategy RDmeans setting the selling
price in Stage 2, not Stage 3. Therefore, the timing at which manufacturers
earn margins is dierent when the equilibrium distribution strategies (RD, D)
or (D, RD) arises. Specifically, a manufacturer that chooses Strategy D earns its
margin after the other manufacturer that chooses Strategy RD earns its margin.
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In addition, the retailer can earn no margin under Strategy RD since the retail
price and wholesale price are equal. Hence, adopting Strategy RD also leads
to the manufacturer avoiding the double marginalization problem. Strategy
RD is superior to Strategy R in that the double marginalization problem can
be avoided. This leads to a asymmetrical channel structure. In addition, the
following corollary is derived.
Corollary 2.2. In terms of manufacturers’ profits, the asymmetrical distribution
strategies of either Strategy (RD, D) or Strategy (D, RD) are always Pareto
ecient.
Matsui (2016) shows that an asymmetrical distribution strategy that results
from the strategic choices of two competingmanufacturers is Pareto-dominated
by a combination of other symmetrical distribution strategies. Specifically, he
shows that if the degree of dierentiation between brands is low and hence
brandhomogeneity is high, it is optimal for bothmanufacturers touse only retail
channels in terms of Pareto eciency. On the contrary, our model shows that
the distribution strategies (RD, D) and (D, RD) always achieve Pareto eciency
in the presence of the product space. This result is new and contributes to the
literature on this topic.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce a product space measured on a one-dimensional
scale into the economic model in which manufacturers determine their distri-
bution strategies to maximize profits and show that asymmetrical distribution
strategies, namely when one manufacturer uses both the retail and the direct
channels, while the other manufacturer uses only the direct channel, are natu-
rally generated as an equilibrium, even among manufacturers with completely
symmetrical conditions. The important assumptions in the model presented in
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this chapter are that the consumer distribution in the product space is uniform
and that disutility due to the deviation of consumers’ preferred location from
the brand location increases proportionally. Restrictions are not imposed on the
other factors, namely, the density of consumers, locations of each brand in the
product space, and marginal costs of production. In other words, as shown in
Table 2.2, our results are independent of the degree of parameters such as d, t,
c, b, x1, and x2, which are exogenously given variables.
Our results provide practical implications, which can be used as decision
support. In particular, our model shows that it is not necessary to adopt a
distribution strategy that is symmetrical with competitors to address a dual-
channel supply chain issues. In addition, when brands compete in the presence
of product space, the asymmetrical distribution channel structure that occurs
spontaneously is Pareto ecient for manufacturers.
Appendix
Appendix 2.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. First, substituting Equation (2.11) into Equations (2.9) and
(2.10), the inverse demand functions are derived as follows. These four equa-
tions are used in the following proofs.
pR1 = B   3

qR1 + q
D
1

  

qR2 + q
D
2

; (2.16)
pD1 = B   3

qR1 + q
D
1

  

qR2 + q
D
2

; (2.17)
pR2 = B   

qR1 + q
D
1

  3

qR2 + q
D
2

; (2.18)
pD2 = B   

qR1 + q
D
1

  3

qR2 + q
D
2

: (2.19)
Because the two manufacturers determine one distribution strategy from
three Strategies R, D, and RD in Stage 1, we derive an optimal pricing strategy
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in Stages 2 and 3 under each of the nine pairs of distribution strategies. Within
the following parentheses, the first letter represents the strategy selected by
Manufacturer 1 and the latter represents the strategy selected by Manufacturer
2. For example, (R, RD) means that Manufacturer 1 distributes products using
the retail channel only, while Manufacturer 2 distributes products using both
the retail and the direct channels.
Case (1): Strategy (R, R)
Because neither manufacturer distributes via the direct channel, we obtain
the demand functions by substituting qD1 = q
D
2 = 0 into Equations (2.16) and
(2.18). Solving them for qR1 and q
R
2 , we have the following demand functions:
qR1 =
2B   3pR1 + pR2
8t
; (2.20)
qR2 =
2B   3pR2 + pR1
8t
: (2.21)
With these demand functions, the retailers’ profits in Stage 3 are as follows:
1 =

pR1   r1

qR1 =

pR1   r1
 
2B   3pR1 + pR2

8t
; (2.22)
2 =

pR2   r2

qR2 =

pR2   r2
 
2B   3pR2 + pR1

8t
: (2.23)
Solving @i=@pRi = 0 tomaximize the retailers’ profits yields the followingprices:
pR1 =
14B + 18r1 + 3r2
35
; (2.24)
pR2 =
14B + 18r2 + 3r1
35
: (2.25)
The profit that is the objective function to be maximized is always a concave
function with respect to the price, which is the strategy variable; hence, the
second-order conditions for maximization are always satisfied. Therefore, in
the following proofs, we omit the descriptions on the second-order conditions.
Substituting Equations (2.20) and (2.21) into Equation (2.27), we have the profits
18 2. Asymmetrical product distribution
of the manufacturers as the functions of the retail prices:
1 = (r1   c) qR1 =
(r1   c)

2B   3pR1 + pR2

8t
; (2.26)
2 = (r2   c) qR2 =
(r2   c)

2B   3pR2 + pR1

8t
: (2.27)
In Stage 2, eachmanufacturer maximizes its profit by plugging Equations (2.24)
and (2.25) into Equations (2.26) and (2.27). Solving @i = @ri = 0, we have
r1 = r2 =
14B + 17c
31
: (2.28)
Substituting Equation (2.28) into Equations (2.26) and (2.27), we yield the equi-
librium profits in this case as follows:
1 = 2 =
357 (B   c)2
9610
:
Case (2): Strategy (R, D)
Since Manufacturer 1 distributes products using the retail channel only,
while Manufacturer 2 distributes products using the direct channel only, we
derive the demand functions by plugging qR1 = q
D
2 = 0 into Equations (2.16) and
(2.19). Solving them for qR1 and q
D
2 , we have the following demand functions:
qR1 =
2B   3pR1 + pD2
8t
; (2.29)
qD2 =
2B   3pD2 + pR1
8t
: (2.30)
With these demand functions, the profits of Retailer 1 and Manufacturer 2 in
Stage 3 are given as follows:
1 =

pR1   r1

qR1 =

pR1   r1
 
2B   3pR1 + pD2

8t
; (2.31)
2 =

pR2   r2

qR2 =

pD2   c
 
2B   3pD2 + pR1

8t
: (2.32)
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Solving @1=@pR1 = @2=@p
D
2 = 0 to maximize the profits yields the following
prices:
pR1 =
14B + 18r1 + 3c
35
; (2.33)
pD2 =
14B + 18c + 3r1
35
: (2.34)
The profit of Manufacturer 1 is as follows:
1 = (r1   c) qR1 : (2.35)
In Stage 2, Manufacturer 1 maximizes its profit by substituting Equations (2.33)
and (2.34) into Equation (2.35). Solving @1=@r1 = 0, we have
r1 =
7B + 10c
17
: (2.36)
Replacing Equations (2.29), (2.30), (2.33), (2.34), and (2.37) into Equations (2.32)
and (2.35), we yield equilibrium profits in this case as follows:
1 =
21 (B   c)2
680
;
2 =
4107 (B   c)2
57800
:
Case (3): Strategy (R, RD)
The profits of the manufacturers and retailers are as follows:
1 = (r1   c) qR1 ; (2.37)
2 = (r2   c) qR2 +

pD2   c

qD2 ; (2.38)
1 =

pR1   r1

qR1 ; (2.39)
2 =

pR2   r2

qR2 : (2.40)
In Stage 3, Manufacturer 2 determines pD2 , while Retailer i determines p
R
i .
Products are distributed by Manufacturer 2 via both the retail and the direct
channels, that is, qR2 and q
D
2 are identical. Therefore, the unique combination
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of prices pR2 and p
D
2 , which constitutes a Nash equilibrium at this stage is p
R
2 =
pD2 = r2 because of Bertrand competition. We prove that p
R
2 = p
D
2 = r2 is only the
equilibrium prices.
First, we show that in the case of Strategy (R, RD), Manufacturer 2 must set
its direct price equal to the retail price, so that pD2 = p
R
2 . If Manufacturer 2 sets its
direct price pD2 lower than the retail price p
R
2 so that p
D
2 < p
R
2 holds, all demand
for brand 2 is concentrated on the direct channel, while there is no demand for
the retail channel, meaning that no product is distributed through that channel.
This situation corresponds to Strategy (R, D). As we must investigate Strategy
(R, RD), pD2 < p
R
2 is inconsistent with this case. On the contrary, if Manufacturer
2 determines its direct price pD2 higher than the retail price p
R
2 so that p
D
2 > p
R
2
holds, all demand for brand 2 is concentrated on the retail channel, while there
is no demand for the direct channel, meaning that no product is distributed
through that channel. This situation corresponds to Strategy (R, R). As wemust
investigate the Strategy (R, RD), pD2 > p
R
2 is inconsistent with this case. Thus,
the manufacturer that adopts Strategy RD sets its direct price as pD2 = p
R
2 .
Second, we show that in the case of Strategy (R, RD), Retailer 2 has to set
its retail price equal to the wholesale price, so that pR2 = r2. We investigate the
following three cases: pD2 > r2, p
D
2 < r2, and p
D
2 = r2. First, if Manufacturer 2
sets its direct price as pD2 > r2, Retailer 2 can acquire all demand for brand 2 by
setting the retail price as pD2   , where  is a positive minimal value. Retailer
2 thus obtains the largest profit by setting the highest possible price. Hence,
in the case of pD2 > r2, the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium does not exist. Second,
we examine the case in which Manufacturer 2 sets its direct price as pD2 < r2.
Retailer 2 must set its retail price pR2 higher than the wholesale price r2 to earn
a non-negative profit. However, if Retailer 2 sets its retail price higher than the
wholesale price so that pR2 > r2 holds, there is no demand for the retail channel
because pD2 < r2 < p
R
2 holds. This situation corresponds to Strategy (R, D). Aswe
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must examine Strategy (R, RD), pD2 < r2 is inconsistent with this case. Third, if
Manufacturer 2 sets its direct price as pD2 = r2, the optimal retail price for Retailer
2 satisfies pR2 = r2 as follows. If the retailer selects the retail price so that p
R
2 > r2,
there is no demand for the retail channel, making it impossible to earn a positive
profit. On the contrary, if the retailer sets its retail price lower than thewholesale
price so that pR2 < r2, the profit of the retailer is negative. Therefore, only the
optimal retail price is consistent with the wholesale price r2. Consequently, the
unique combination of prices pR2 and p
D
2 that is the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
in Stage 3 is pR2 = p
D
2 = r2.
In Stage 3, Retailer 1 sets its retail price to maximize its profit. Substituting
qD1 = 0 and p
R
2 = r2 into Equation (2.18) and solving this inverse demand
function for qR2 + q
D
2 , we have the demand function of brand 2 as q
R
2 + q
D
2 =
2B   3r2 + pR1

=8. Substituting this and qD1 = 0 into Equation (2.16), we have
the demand function of brand 1 as qR1 =

2B   3pR1 + r2

=8. Plugging this
demand function into Equation (2.39) and solving @1=@pR1 = 0, we have
pR1 =
2B + 3r1 + r2
6
: (2.41)
In Stage 2, substituting the equilibrium combination of prices in Stage 3 as
pR2 = p
D
2 = r2, the demand function q
R
2 + q
D
2 =

2B   3r2 + pR1

=8, and Equation
(2.41) into Equations (2.37) and (2.38), each manufacturer maximizes its profit
for its wholesale price. Solving @i=@ri = 0, we have
r1 =
82B + 119c
201
; (2.42)
r2 =
30B + 37c
67
: (2.43)
Substituting the demand functions, that is, qR1 =

2B   3pR1 + r2

=8 and qR2 +q
D
2 =
2B   3r2 + pR1

=8, the equilibrium combination of the prices as pR2 = p
D
2 = r2,
and Equations (2.42) and (2.43) into Equations (2.37) and (2.38), we yield the
22 2. Asymmetrical product distribution
equilibrium profits in this case as follows:
1 =
1681 (B   c)2
53868
;
2 =
1275 (B   c)2
17856
:
Case (4): Strategy (D, R)
This case is the opposite of Case (2): Strategy (R, D) in terms of manu-
facturers’ strategies, and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits in equilib-
rium derived in Case (2) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (5): Strategy (D, D)
Since neither manufacturer uses the retail channel, we have the demand
functions by substituting qR1 = q
R
2 = 0 into Equations (2.17) and (2.19). Solving
them for qD1 and q
D
2 , we have the following demand functions:
qD1 =
2B   3pD1 + pD2
8t
; (2.44)
qD2 =
2B   3pD2 + pD1
8t
: (2.45)
With these demand functions, the profits of the manufacturers in Stage 3 are
given as
1 =

pD1   c

qD1 =

pD1   c
 
2B   3pD1 + pD2

8t
; (2.46)
2 =

pD2   c

qD2 =

pD2   c
 
2B   3pD2 + pD1

8t
: (2.47)
Solving @1=@pD1 = @2=@p
D
2 = 0 to maximize the profits yields the following
prices:
pD1 = p
D
2 =
2B + 3c
5
: (2.48)
Substituting Equations (2.44), (2.45), and (2.48) into Equations (2.46) and (2.47),
we derive the equilibrium profits in this case as follows:
1 = 2 =
3 (B   c)2
50
:
A. Proofs 23
Case (6): Strategy (D, RD)
The profits of the manufacturers and Retailer 2 are as follows:
1 =

pD1   c

qD1 ; (2.49)
2 = (r2   c) qR2 +

pD2   c

qD2 ; (2.50)
2 =

pR2   r2

qR2 : (2.51)
In Stage 3, Manufacturer i sets pDi , while Retailer 2 sets p
R
2 . Owing to Bertrand
competition, the combination of prices pR2 and p
D
2 that constitutes the Nash
equilibrium in Stage 3 is pR2 = p
D
2 = r2, as proven in Case (3): Strategy (R, RD).
In Stage 3, Manufacturer 1 maximizes its profit for its direct price pD1 . Sub-
stituting qR1 = 0 and p
R
2 = r2 into Equations (2.17) and (2.18), we derive the
demand functions as qD1 =

2B   3pD1 + r2

=8 and qR2 + q
D
2 =

2B   3r2 + pD1

=8.
Replacing these functions with Equation (2.49), we have the following price by
solving @1=@pD1 = 0:
pD1 =
2B + r2 + 3c
6
: (2.52)
In Stage 2, substituting the equilibrium combination of the prices in Stage 3
as pR2 = p
D
2 = r2, the demand functions, that is, q
D
1 =

2B   3pD1 + r2

=8 and
qR2 + q
D
2 =

2B   3r2 + pD1

=8, and Equation (2.52) into Equations (2.49) and
(2.50), Manufacturer 2 maximizes it profit for its wholesale price. Solving
@2=@r2 = 0, we have
r2 =
7B + 10c
17
: (2.53)
Substituting the equilibrium combination of prices as pR2 = p
D
2 = r2, the demand
functions, that is, qD1 =

2B   3pD1 + r2

=8 and qR2 + q
D
2 =

2B   3r2 + pD1

=8,
Equations (2.52) and (2.53) into Equations (2.49) and (2.50), we yield the equi-
librium profits in this case as follows:
1 =
1681 (B   c)2
27744
;
2 =
49 (B   c)2
816
:
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Case (7): Strategy (RD, R)
This case is the opposite of Case (3): Strategy (R, RD) in terms of man-
ufacturers’ strategies and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits in equilib-
rium derived in Case (3) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (8): Strategy (RD, D)
This case is the opposite of Case (6): Strategy (D, RD) in terms of man-
ufacturers’ strategies and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits in equilib-
rium derived in Case (6) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (9): Strategy (RD, RD)
The profits of the manufacturers and retailers are as follows:
1 = (r1   c) qR1 +

pD1   c

qD1 ; (2.54)
2 = (r2   c) qR2 +

pD2   c

qD2 ; (2.55)
1 =

pR1   r1

qR1 ; (2.56)
2 =

pR2   r2

qR2 : (2.57)
In Stage 3, Manufacturer i sets pDi , while Retailer i sets p
R
i . Owing to Bertrand
competition, the combinations of prices pRi and p
D
i that constitutes theNash equi-
librium in Stage 3 are pRi = p
D
i = ri, as proven in Case (3): Strategy (R, RD). Sub-
stituting the combinations of prices as pRi = p
D
i = ri into Equations (2.16), (2.17),
(2.18), and (2.19), we derive the demand functions as qRi +q
D
i =

2B   3ri + r j

=8.
Substituting the combinations of prices and demand functions into Equations
(2.54) and (2.55) and solving @i=@ri = 0, we have
r1 = r2 =
2B + 3c
5
: (2.58)
Substituting these combinations of prices, thedemand functions, and thewhole-
sale prices into Equations (2.54) and (2.55), we yield the equilibrium profits in
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this case as follows:
1 = 2 =
3 (B   c)2
50
:

Proof of Proposition 2.1. Henceforth, (Si;S j)i is defined as the profit of Manu-
facturer iwhenmanufacturers i and j, respectively, adopt distribution strategies
Si and S j. From Table 2.2, we derive the following inequalities:
(RD;D)i  (D;D)i > 0; (2.59)
(RD;D)i  (R;D)i > 0; (2.60)
(D;RD)i  (R;RD)i > 0; (2.61)
(D;RD)i  (RD;RD)i > 0: (2.62)
Inequalities (2.59) and (2.60) show that the optimal strategy for Manufacturer
i is Strategy RD when Manufacturer j adopts Strategy D. Inequalities (2.61)
and (2.62) show that the optimal strategy for Manufacturer i is Strategy Dwhen
Manufacturer j adopts Strategy RD. Therefore, the combinations of distribution
strategies (D, RD) and (RD, D) constitute the Nash equilibrium in Stage 1 and
the SPNE in the whole game. 
Proof of Corollary 2.1. From Table 2.2, the following inequality holds:
(D;RD)i  (RD;D)i > 0;
which proves this corollary. 
Proof of Corollary 2.2. This is clear from Table 2.2. 

3
Effectiveness of exclusive territories by
competing manufacturers managing
dual-channel supply chains
3.1 Introduction
Multichannel sales have become increasingly common because of the rapid
development of the Internet among households. Under these economic condi-
tions, manufacturers, which traditionally sell their products through retailers,
may find it easier to tackle direct sales. A number of well-knownmanufacturers
such as Apple, Cisco Systems, Eastman Kodak, Estee Lauder, Hewlett-Packard,
IBM, Lenovo, Nike, Pioneer Electronics, and recently even automobile manu-
facturer Daimler AG have opened online channels to sell their products directly
to consumers1. However, whether direct sales substitute or complement exist-
ing retail sales is a major challenge for manufacturers seeking ways to allow
direct and retail channels to coexist.
One problem that a manufacturer using dual-channel supply chains often
faces is what level of market power should be granted to retailers. When a
manufacturer sells products directly to consumers, the higher market power
of a retailer improves the manufacturer’s profit by selling more of the brand;
however, at the same time, it harms its profit because itmay reduce sales through
1Tsay and Agrawal (2004a, 2004b) provide real-world manufacturing company cases of
dual-channel supply chain management.
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the direct channel. Further, we must not ignore the double marginalization
arising from retailers’ market power, which also erodes the manufacturer’s
profit. Manufacturers often use exclusive geographical sales territories as a
means to guarantee the market power of retailers.
Given the present economic environments faced by manufacturers, this
chapter investigates the supply chain management problem, namely whether a
manufacturer should apply exclusive sales territories when it distributes prod-
ucts through dual-channel supply chains comprising not only retail but also
direct channels. Specifically, we consider a case that each of two competing
manufacturers that sell their products in two regions through dual channels
can choose their supply chain strategies in the following two dimensions. The
first dimension is the product distribution policy (retail channel, direct channel,
or both) and the second is whether to grant local monopolies to retailers that
sell the manufacturer’s brand in an exclusive territory.
We first demonstrate that even when a manufacturer can use a direct chan-
nel to sell products to end consumers, there exist circumstances in which the
adoption of exclusive territories in the retail channel is the optimal strategy for
the manufacturer and hence increases its profit. More formally, the strategy
for a manufacturer that distributes products through dual-channels to apply
exclusive territories constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in
our game-theoretic model. Because the direct sales of products can reach ex-
tensive consumers regardless of the geographical area, we expect at first glance
that when direct sales are conducted, the adoption of exclusive territories has
no economic role that contributes to the manufacturers’ profits. However, our
result from this research suggests the contrary: the eectiveness of exclusive
territories in a retail channel never completely disappears even with the use of
dual-channels by a manufacturer.
Another noteworthy result from our analysis is that when a manufacturer
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can use dual channels as in our model, the adoption of exclusive territories can
improve its profit even if the products are more dierentiated between man-
ufacturers than when the manufacturer can use only a single retail channel.
Furthermore, when the manufacturer applies exclusive territories in its retail
channel, it always distribute its products through not only the retail channel
but also the direct channel in the SPNE. As briefly mentioned at the beginning
of this section, we consider automobile manufacturing companies in Europe
as a real-world example that copes with the distribution problems of exclu-
sive territories as well as dual-channel supply chain management. While car
manufacturers have long received special treatment, called the block exemption
granted by the European Commission, a new regulationwas introduced in 2002
to promote competition. Under this regulation, car manufacturers can apply
a so-called exclusive distribution system (i.e., exclusive territories) or choose
a selective distribution system. They cannot apply both systems. A selective
distribution system permits car manufacturers to choose their authorized part-
ners, whereas the latter must be permitted to actively sell into other territories.
Brenkers and Verboven (2006) evaluate the impact of competition between car
dealers in the European car market and show that a distribution system that
limits the number of dealers in the respective geographical area allows the firms
to retain market power. Overall, previous empirical studies show that exclu-
sive territories have a substantial impact on retail prices and that competing
manufacturers are more likely to choose the distribution method that provides
market power to downstream retailers. Moreover, Daimler AG has recently
started to sell Mercedes-Benz cars directly to consumers in Europe2. Given the
circumstances in the European automobile market, it is thus realistic to assume
that amanufacturer managing dual-channel supply chains determines whether
to apply exclusive territories as in the model presented in this chapter.
2https://www.online-store.mercedes-benz.de/.
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To the best of the author’s knowledge, no previous research has examined
the economic eects of exclusive territories under the circumstances in which
a manufacturer can distribute products through dual channels, even though
this issue is crucial because the dual-channel supply chain system is rapidly
prevailing in various manufacturing industries. Indeed, manufacturers that
already apply exclusive territories, such as automobile manufacturers in EU
countries, encounter the problem of dual-channel supply chain management in
the presence of such territories. This chapter is the first to address this prob-
lem based on a game-theoretic framework, thereby drawing useful managerial
insights for manufacturers that need to cope with the two types of distribution
policies simultaneously: exclusive territories and dual-channel supply chain
management. Consequently, the investigation of the eects of exclusive terri-
tories under the assumption of dual-channel supply chains is also regarded as
an original contribution of the present research.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a
review of the literature on exclusive territories and dual-channel supply chain
management. In Section 3.3, we describe the basic settings of our model. Then,
we construct a benchmark model in which a manufacturer can distribute prod-
ucts only through a single retail channel in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we
construct a dual-channel model and investigate the eects of exclusive terri-
tories, identifying the SPNE that specifies the choices of both the distribution
channels and the adoption of exclusive territories as well as comparing the
results with the benchmark single-channel model. The final section concludes.
3.2 Literature review
While several studies examine the eects of exclusive territories based on the
game-theoretic approach, the seminal work in this research strand is Rey and
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Stiglitz (1995). They show that exclusive territoriesmake the demand curve that
competing firms face less elastic, which in turn increases the equilibrium price
and manufacturers’ profits, even in the absence of the franchise fees imposed
by the manufacturer for recapturing retailers’ rents. They analyze this strate-
gic eect in a model that specifies the full range of feasible vertical contracts;
thus, they endogenize both whether exclusive contracts are employed and, if
employed, the contract terms. They show that the equilibria involve exclusive
territories, resulting in higher prices and profits. Contrary to Rey and Stiglitz
(1995), who assume a manufacturer is allowed to use only a single channel (i.e.,
the retail channel), we examine the eectiveness of exclusive territories when
dual channels can be used for distributing products. Dutta et al. (1994) intro-
duce a transaction cost approach to investigate a manufacturer’s policy toward
exclusive territory retailers that sell across their assigned territories (bootleg).
They show that the optimal enforcement policy is to tolerate some level of boot-
legging. Further, they show that deploying exclusive territories is beneficial to
the manufacturer because it safeguards retailer services and permits retailers to
capitalize on their superior local information. Martin-Herran et al. (2011) apply
a dierential game framework to examine the eects of a variety of franchise
contracts including exclusive territory clauses. If the territories assigned to
franchisees allow them to enjoy local monopolies, whether franchisees behave
cooperatively or competitively does not aect the decisions of the franchisor
or the franchisees, and hence gives them the same profits. In addition, they
comprehensively examine the eects of contracts when exclusive territories are
not adopted. Based on a repeated game framework, Piccolo and Reisinger
(2011) highlight that exclusive territories are reasonable in a framework of re-
peated interactions between competing supply chains. They show that two
countervailing eects of exclusive territories make manufacturers sustain tacit
collusion. The first eect is that competition in a one-shot game is mitigated by
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granting local monopolies to retailers, which makes deviation more profitable.
The second eect is that retailers of competing brands immediately adjust their
prices to thewholesale contract oered by a deviantmanufacturer, whichmakes
deviation disadvantageous. They show that the adoption of exclusive territo-
ries is a more suitable organizational mode for cooperation because the second
eect tends to dominate. The present chapter is positioned as a contribution to
this research field.
Another research field is closely related to the present chapter, namely the
management of dual-channel supply chains including traditional retailers and
direct sales. Studies in this domain have typically investigate the economic
eects of the implementationof adirect Internet channel (e.g., Balasubramanian,
1998; Chiang et al., 2003; Yao and Liu, 2003; Tsay and Agrawal, 2004a, 2004b;
Chiang and Monahan, 2005; Yao et al., 2005; Cattani et al., 2006; Kurata et
al., 2007; Bernstein et al., 2008; Dumrongsiri et al., 2008; Mukhopadhyay et
al., 2008; Huang and Swaminathan, 2009; Cai, 2010; Chiang, 2010; Hua et al.,
2010, Khouja and Wang, 2010; Xu and Zhao, 2010; Cai et al., 2012; Chen et al.,
2012; Chen et al., 2013; Hsiao and Chen, 2013; Cao, 2014; David and Adida,
2015; Li et al., 2015; Rodriguez and Aydin, 2015; Matsui, 2016, 2017; Liu et al.
2016). Balasubramanian (1998) constructs an economic model to investigate the
competition between direct marketers and traditional retailers by taking into
account the product adaptability to the direct sales channel and the product
information revealed to customers. He shows that direct marketers improve
their profits by lowering the level ofmarket information on the direct channel in
the case of low product adaptability because the lower information level softens
competition between the direct marketer and conventional retailers. Chiang
et al. (2003) construct a supply chain model including a manufacturer and its
independent retailer and investigate themanufacturer’s decision to sell through
the retailer, direct using the Internet channel, or through a mixture of both
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channels. They show that the manufacturer can improve overall profitability
due to the introduction of direct sales by reducing inecient price double
marginalization. Liu et al. (2006) show taht when price consistency at the
retailer level is critical in the market, the entry of an online retailer can be
deterred by an incumbent traditional retailer’s strategically refraining from
entering online. By contrast, in markets in which price consistency is not a
constraint, the incumbent can deter the entry of a pure-play online retailer only
if it enters online. Chen et al. (2013) consider the price competition between
a manufacturer with direct online sales and a traditional independent retailer.
The retailer sells a substitute product sold by another manufacturer in addition
to themanufacturer’s product. They find that an improvement in brand loyalty
makes both the manufacturer and the retailer profitable and that the increased
service valuemay diminish the threat of the direct channel and thereby increase
the manufacturer’s profit.
Despite the significant volume of dual-channel supply chain management
research, this review of the literature suggests that studies incorporating the
choice of exclusive territories into the dual-channel management problem are
lacking, even though this issue is realistic and crucial to manufacturers. There-
fore, this chapter is the first to examine the desirability of exclusive territories
in the context of dual-channel supply chain management.
3.3 Model and assumptions
Table 3.1 lists the variables used in ourmodel. Suppose that twomanufacturers,
Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2, produce dierentiated products and sell
them to consumers. Each of these two manufacturers produces a product with
no marginal or fixed cost and sells the product through a conventional retailer,
which we define as the retail channel, or through an online channel, which
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Table 3.1: Notation
Notation
p Retail price or Direct price
q Quantity
Q Quantity
r Wholesale price
t Substitutability of products supplied through two dierent
channels by the same manufacturer (0 < t < 1)
d Substitutability of products supplied by the two manufacturers
in the same channel (0 < d < 1)
i Subscript that indexes the brand supplied by the samemanufac-
turer (i = 1 or 2 )
j Subscript that denotes the region in which a retailer exists ( j = a
or b )
J Subscript that denotes the region inwhich demand arises ( J = A
or B )
 Profit of the manufacturer
 Profit of the retailer
RT Strategy of distributing products using the retail channel only
with exclusive territories
RDT Strategy of distributing products using both the retail and the
direct channels with exclusive territories
RN Strategyofdistributingproductsusing the retail channelwithout
exclusive territories
RDN Strategy of distributing products using both the retail and the
direct channels without exclusive territories
D Strategy of distributing products using the direct channel only
a; b Region in which a retailer is located
A;B Region as a market in which a firm sells its products
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Figure 3.1: Structure of markets and supply chain
Note: If Manufacturer i adopts exclusive territories, the market of brand iR is completely
separated into the two regions, as shown by the dotted line in the market.
we define as the direct channel. If a manufacturer uses the retail channel, it
initially sells products to a retailer, which subsequently resells the products to
end consumers. Moreover, we assume that the markets are separated in two
regionsdenotedbyRegion a andRegion b (or, equivalently, RegionA andRegion
B) and that the market characteristics are symmetrical between the two regions.
In each region, there exist two retailers, each of which respectively handles
the products supplied by each manufacturer. Let Retailer i j denote the retailer
located in Region j ( j = a; b) that resells the products sold by Manufacturer i
(i = 1; 2). Henceforth, j represents the region in which the retailer is located,
while i indexes the brand of a product supplied by the same manufacturer. Fig.
3.1 describes the market and structure of the supply chains.
We assume that each manufacturer chooses its supply chain strategy in the
following two dimensions. The first dimension is the channel strategy for a
manufacturer to distribute its products. Under “Strategy R,” the manufacturer
distributes its products using only the traditional retail channel; under “Strategy
D,” themanufacturer distributes its products using only the direct channel; and
under “Strategy RD,” the manufacturer distributes its products using both the
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retail and the direct channels. We define the brand of Manufacturer i sold
through the retail channel as brand iR and that sold through the direct channel
as brand iD. The second dimension of the strategy for each manufacturer is the
territory strategy (i.e., whether to apply exclusive territories). Under “Strategy
T,” the manufacturer adopts exclusive territories in its retail channel, while
under “strategy N,” it does not. If Manufacturer i chooses Strategy T, Retailer
i j sells brand iR as the monopolist exclusively in Region j. In other words,
adopting Strategy T means that the manufacturer allows the retailer to earn a
margin. To sum up, we call the mixture of the channel strategy and territory
strategy the “supply chain strategy” throughout this chapter. Themanufacturer
can choose among five supply chain strategies: Strategies RT, RN, RDT, RDN,
and D3.
Following Singh andVives (1984), we assume the representative consumer’s
utility function4 in Region J5 is as follows:
U =

QR1;J +Q
D
1;J +Q
R
2;J +Q
D
2;J

  1
2

QR1;J
2
+

QD1;J
2
+

QR2;J
2
+

QD2;J
2
 
n
d

QR1;JQ
R
2;J +Q
D
1;JQ
D
2;J

+ t

QR1;JQ
D
1;J +Q
R
2;JQ
D
2;J

+ dt

QR1;JQ
D
2;J +Q
R
2;JQ
D
1;J
o
 

pR1;JQ
R
1;J + p
D
1;JQ
D
1;J + p
R
2;JQ
R
2;J + p
D
2;JQ
D
2;J

; (3.1)
where QRi;J is the demand for brand iR from consumers in Region J and Q
D
i;J
3When a manufacturer distributes products only through the direct channel, whether it
adopts exclusive territories does not matter because no retailer sells its product. In other words,
we need not distinguish the territory strategy (i.e., Strategy T or N) when the manufacturer
chooses the direct channel strategy (Strategy D)
4This type of representative consumer’s utility function is used in studies examining the
dual-channel supply chain problem such as Cai (2010), Cai et al. (2012), and Hsiao and Chen
(2013).
5The two combinations of the notations of upper cases of A and B and lower cases of a and
b are used to indicate the two regions, because we need to distinguish the market and retailer
location separately in our exclusive territory model. In other words, if Manufacturer i does not
adopt exclusive territories, both Retailers ia and ib may sell brand iR in the two regions of A
and B.
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is the demand for brand iD from consumers in Region J (i = 1; 2 and J = A,
B). Likewise, pRi;J is the price of brand iR in Region J, and p
D
i;J is the price of
brand iD in Region J. Hereafter,  i represents a brand that is dierent from
brand i; that is, (i; i) signifies either (1; 2) or (2; 1). The exogenous parameter
d 2 (0; 1) represents the degree of substitution between the brands supplied by
the dierent manufacturers and t 2 (0; 1) represents the degree of substitution
between the retail and the direct channels supplied by the same manufacturer.
Put dierently, when d or t is close to 0 (1), the products are more dieren-
tiated (homogeneous). These two parameters imply that consumers perceive
that products are dierentiated not only between the manufacturers but also
between the channels.
We derive the following inverse demand functions for brands iR and iD in
Region J by solving the representative consumer’s utility maximization prob-
lem, that is @U=@QRi;J = @U=@Q
D
i;J = 0:
pRi;J = 1  
n
QRi;J + tQ
D
i;J + d

QR i;J + tQ
D
 i;J
o
; (3.2)
pDi;J = 1  
n
QDi;J + tQ
R
i;J + d

QD i;J + tQ
R
 i;J
o
: (3.3)
The intercepts of the inverse demand functions in Equations (3.2) and (3.3)
are normalized to 1 for the tractability of the model. Given the inverse demand
functions of Equations (3.2) and (3.3), the profits of Manufacturer i, i, that
distributes products using only the retail channel, only the direct channel, and
both the retail and the direct channels, respectively, are
i = ri

QRi;A +Q
R
i;B

; (3.4)
i = pDi;AQ
D
i;A + p
D
i;BQ
D
i;B; (3.5)
i = ri

QRi;A +Q
R
i;B

+ pDi;AQ
D
i;A + p
D
i;BQ
D
i;B; (3.6)
where ri represents the wholesale price of the product sold by Manufacturer
i. When the product is sold via the retail channel, the manufacturer earns the
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Figure 3.2: Timeline of events
margin for the quantity sold in RegionsA and B through its wholesale price. On
the contrary, when the product is sold via the direct channel, the manufacturer
earns the margin for the quantity sold in Regions A and B through its direct
price. The profit of Retailer i in Region j, i j, is
i j =

pRi;A   ri

qi j;A +

pRi;B   ri

qi j;B; (3.7)
where qi j;J denotes the quantity of brand iR sold by Retailer i j in the market of
Region J. Because demand for brand iR matches with the total supply by the
two retailers, QRi;J = qia;J + qib;J holds.
Following Cai (2010), who constructs a typical dual-channel supply chain
mathematical model, we assume the timeline of our model shown in Fig. 3.2.
Each manufacturer first determines its supply chain strategy (i.e., Strategy RT,
RN, RDT, RDN, or D) in Stage 1. Then, a manufacturer that distributes through
a retail channel sets the wholesale price ri and sells the product to the retailer at
that price in Stage 2. Finally, price competition arises in Stage 3; the retail price
pDi;J or p
R
i;J is determined either by the manufacturer that distributes products via
the direct channel or by the retailer in the retail channel used by the manufac-
turer. We adopt the SPNE as the equilibrium concept6 because we construct our
6Our model is classified as a dynamic game because it involves three stages in which each
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model based on the framework of a dynamic game of complete information.
We solve the game by backward induction to identify the SPNE.
3.4 Benchmark: single-channel case
Before examining the dual-channel model, we suppose that the two manufac-
turers use only a single retail channel. Until a few decades ago, building a direct
channel was prohibitively costly for a manufacturer, meaning that it was only
able to distribute its products through its indirect retail channel. To describe
such a past environment, we first construct a model in which a manufacturer
can only use its retail channel to distribute its products. In this benchmark
model, the manufacturer chooses one of the two strategies classified by the
territory strategy (i.e., Strategy T or N). The following lemma summarizes the
equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1. The combinations of the territory strategies that constitute the
SPNE depend on d as follows. The first and second letters in the parentheses
respectively denote the strategies chosen by Manufacturers 1 and 2.
Strategy (T, T) if 0:972 < d
Strategies (T, N) and (N, T) if 0:912 < d < 0:972
Strategy (N, N) if d < 0:912
Lemma3.1 suggests that if manufacturers are constrained to using only retail
channels, exclusive territories are adopted in the SPNE only if d > 0:912. The
logic behind Lemma 3.1 can be explained by the trade-o between the avoid-
ance of the double marginalization problem and the second-mover advantage
player makes a decision, as Fig. 3.2 illustrates. In addition, ourmodel is classified as a complete
information game because the model includes no random variables and each firm thus knows
the form of the payo functions of all the other firms. These two facts ensure that the model
presented in this chapter is classified as a dynamic game of complete information.
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under Bertrand competition, as follows. As a manufacturer does not adopt ex-
clusive territories, Bertrand competition between retailers with homogeneous
goods occurs, and the retail prices match the wholesale price. This means that
the double marginalization problem is avoided and that the selling price is de-
termined in Stage 2 of the game, not Stage 3. Meanwhile, as the manufacturer
adopts exclusive territories, retailers have the market power. This means that
the double marginalization problem appears and that the selling price is deter-
mined in Stage 3 of the game. The game-theoretic literature (e.g., Gal-Or, 1985)
has shown that if Bertrand competition occurs, a firm that sets its selling price
in a later stage earns a higher profit than a firm that sets its selling price in an
earlier stage. Hence, adopting exclusive territories means enjoying the second-
mover advantage, whereas not adopting exclusive territories means avoiding
the double marginalization problem. Therefore, when the degree of horizontal
dierentiation between the brands supplied by dierentmanufacturers is large,
that is, when d < 0:912, it is desirable for the manufacturers not to adopt ex-
clusive territories because they earn a high margin. On the contrary, when the
degree of horizontal dierentiation is small, that is, 0:912 < d, it is desirable for
manufacturers to adopt exclusive territories because they earn a low margin.
We compare the major results drawn from our main dual-channel model in the
next section with this benchmark result.
3.5 Main results: dual-channel case
Based on the assumptions in Section 3.3, we derive an optimal supply chain
strategy for each manufacturer under dual-channel supply chain management,
which constitutes the SPNE. Because our model involves only the two exoge-
nous parameters of d and t, we compute the payos of the manufacturers by
adopting the supply chain strategy using the specific values of these two pa-
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rameters. Specifically, we compute the profits by substituting multiple values
of d and t by changing t from 0.01 to 0.99 in increments of 0.01 and d from 0 to
1 in increments of 0.05 into the profits of the two manufacturers according to
the supply chain strategy. Then, we construct a payomatrix that includes the
payos by the supply chain strategy of the two players (i.e., manufacturers),
thereby identifying the SPNE. Lastly, we present which supply chain strategy
constitutes the SPNE based on the classification of the parameter regions in the
two-dimensional space against the horizontal axis as t and the vertical axis as d.
Fig. 3.3 illustrates this relationships. While we do not present analytical forms
of the equilibrium profits because of their complicated equations, including the
higher-order expressions of d and t, one can correctly derive the equilibrium
profits by tracking the optimization processes in the Appendix7.
Observation 3.1. Fig. 3.3 illustrates the combinations of supply chain strategies
that constitute the SPNE classified by the region into which the two parameters
of d and t fall.
Fig. 3.3 suggests several notable results on the equilibrium supply chain
strategies. Under some circumstances, exclusive territories are adopted at the
7For example, Fig. 3.3 suggests that Strategy (RDT, RDT) can arise in equilibrium. The
payo for the manufacturer in this equilibrium is as follows:
i =
n
(1   d) [2   d + t (1   t)]
h
(2   d)3 (2 + d)2

24   8d   21d2 + 4d3 + 5d4

  t (2   d)2 (2 + d)
16   24d   18d2 + 19d3 + 10d4   3d5   2d6

+ t2

160   112d   528d2 + 368d3 + 446d4
 321d5   145d6 + 111d7 + 17d8   14d9

+ t3

48   96d   112d2 + 184d3 + 101d4   138d5
 34d6 + 48d7 + 3d8   6d9

  t4

48   48d + 6d2 + d3   73d4 + 64d5 + 60d6   51d7   15d8
+12d9

+ t5d2

23   40d   33d2 + 58d3 + 17d4   32d5   3d6 + 6d7

+ t6 (1   d)

6 + d   16d2
+d3 + 2d4   3d5 + 6d6 + d7   2d8

  t7 (1   d)2 (1 + d)2

1 + 2d2   d4

+ t8 (1   d)3 (1 + d)2
1 + 2d2   d4
io
=
n
(1 + d) (1 + t)
h
(2   d)3 (2 + d)

4   d   2d2

  2t2

4   8d   5d2 + 13d3
 2d4   5d5 + 2d6

  t4

2 + 3d + 4d2   d3   2d4
i2
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium classified by the values of the parameters
Note: The first and second letters in a parenthesis written on a region represent the equilibrium
supply chain strategies chosen by the two manufacturers when the two parameters (d and t)
fall into that region. For example, the region in which the two parentheses (RDT, RDN) and
(RN, D) are included indicates that the two equilibria involving the respective combination of
strategies arise when the parameters fall into that region.
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SPNE. In other words, in some regions, the combinations of Strategy (RDT,
RDN) or (RDT, RDT) arise in the figure when the value of d is relatively high.
At first glance, when direct sales are conducted, the adoption of exclusive terri-
tories in a retail channel is expected to have no economic role that contributes to
themanufacturers’ profits because direct sales of products can reach consumers
irrespective of their geographical area. However, Fig. 3.3 suggests the contrary:
the eectiveness of exclusive territories never completely disappears even with
the use of dual-channels.
Next, let us compare the results from the dual-channel model with those
from the single-channel model in Section 3.4. Remember Lemma 3.1 of the
benchmark model showed that exclusive territories are adopted at the SPNE
only when d > 0:912. Meanwhile, Fig. 3.3 shows that even if d < 0:912,
namely, even when the product dierentiation between manufacturers is rel-
atively large, there arise extensive regions in which Strategy (RDT, RDN) or
(RDT, RDT), which involves the adoption of exclusive territories, constitutes
the equilibrium. For example, Fig. 3.3 suggests that even when d = 0:85, which
obviously satisfies d < 0:912, the adoption of exclusive territories constitutes
the SPNE when 0:25 < t < 0:71. This is a noteworthy result: when a manufac-
turer is allowed to use dual channels as in our model, the adoption of exclusive
territories can improve its profits even if the products are more dierentiated
between manufacturers than when the manufacturer can use only a single re-
tail channel. Furthermore, Fig. 3.3 suggests that the equilibrium strategies that
involve the adoption of exclusive territories include Strategies (RDT, RDN) and
(RDT, RDT), meaning that a manufacturer which adopts exclusive territories
(i.e., Strategy T) always distributes its products through both the retail and the
direct channels (i.e., Strategy RD) at the SPNE. This result indicates that if a
manufacturer adopts exclusive territories and sells its products through only
the retail channel in a limited sales territory, its market share decreases because
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the rivalmanufacturer uses both the retail and the direct channels to promote its
brand in extensive markets. Therefore, the manufacturer should sell its brand
not only through the retail channel with a limited sales area but also through
the direct channel to maintain its market share.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the supply chain management problem of whether
a manufacturer should apply exclusive sales territories when it can distribute
products throughdual-channel supply chains comprising retail anddirect chan-
nels. The adoption of exclusive territories in the presence of dual channels is
a critical problem for manufacturers such as Daimler AG in Europe. Our re-
sults suggest that even when a manufacturer can use the direct channel to sell
its products to end consumers, there exist circumstances in which the adop-
tion of exclusive territories in the retail channel is the optimal strategy for the
manufacturer and hence increases its profit. Moreover, we show that when a
manufacturer can use dual channels as in our model, the adoption of exclusive
territories can boost its profit even if the products are more dierentiated be-
tween manufacturers than when the manufacturer can use only a single retail
channel. Finally, when the manufacturer applies exclusive territories, it always
distributes its products through not only the retail channel but also the direct
channel in equilibrium.
The above resultswere derived precisely based on the game-theoretic frame-
work that describes the strategic behavior of firms. In this respect, our unique
implications are robust and thus serve as a guideline for decision making by
manufacturers that need to simultaneously determine the two distribution poli-
cies of exclusive territories and dual-channel supply chain management.
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Appendix
Appendix 3.A Proofs
In the proofs below, we use the inverse demand functions of each supply chain
strategy.
If both the manufacturers use the retail channel only, substituting QDi;J = 0
into Equation (3.2) and solving for QRi;J, the demand function is
QRi;J =
1   d   pRi;J + dpR i;J
1   d2 : (3.8)
If both the manufacturers use the direct channel only, substituting QDi;J = 0 into
Equation (3.3) and solving for QDi;J, the demand function is
QDi;J =
1   d   pDi;J + dpD i;J
1   d2 : (3.9)
If Manufacturer i uses the retail channel only, while Manufacturer  i uses the
direct channel only, substituting QDi;J = Q
R
 i;J = 0 into Equations (3.2) and (3.3)
and solving for QRi;J and Q
D
 i;J, the demand functions are
QRi;J =
1   dt   pRi;J + dtpD i;J
1   d2t2 ; (3.10)
QD i;J =
1   dt   pD i;J + dtpRi;J
1   d2t2 : (3.11)
If both the manufacturers use the retail and the direct channels, solving Equa-
tions (3.2) and (3.3) for QRi;J and Q
D
i;J, the demand functions are
QRi;J =
(1   d) (1   t)   pRi;J + tpDi;J + dpR i;J + dtpD i;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) ; (3.12)
QDi;J =
(1   d) (1   t)   pDi;J + tpRi;J + dpD i;J + dtpR i;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) : (3.13)
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If Manufacturer i uses both the retail and the direct channels, while Manufac-
turer  i uses the retail channel only, substituting QD i;J = 0 into Equations (3.2)
and (3.3) and solving for QRi;J, Q
D
i;J and Q
R
 i;J, the demand functions are
QRi;J =
(1   d) (1   t) (1   dt)    1   d2t2 pRi;J +  1   d2 tpDi;J + d  1   t2 pR i;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) ;
(3.14)
QDi;J =
1   t   pDi;J + tpRi;J
1   t2 ; (3.15)
QR i;J =
1   d   pR i;J + dpRi;J
1   d2 : (3.16)
If Manufacturers i uses both the retail and the direct channels, while Manufac-
turer  i uses the direct channel only, substituting QR i;J = 0 into Equations (3.2)
and (3.3) and solving for QRi;J, Q
D
i;J and Q
D
 i;J, the demand functions are
QRi;J =
1   t   pRi;J + tpDi;J
1   t2 ; (3.17)
QDi;J =
(1   d) (1   t) (1   dt)    1   d2t2 pDi;J +  1   d2 tpRi;J + d  1   t2 pD i;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) ;
(3.18)
QD i;J =
1   d   pD i;J + dpDi;J
1   d2 : (3.19)
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Because both the manufacturers use the retail channel
only, the demand function is
QRi;J =
1   d   pRi;J + dpR i;J
1   d2 : (3.8)
IfManufacturer i does not adopt exclusive territories (StrategyN), pRi;A = p
R
i;R = ri
holds due to price competition. By contrast, if Manufacturer i adopts exclusive
territories (Strategy T), the profit of Retailer i j is i j =

pRi;J   ri

QRi;J. After
substituting the inverse demand function derived from Equation (3.8) into the
retailer’s profit, we maximize the profit with respect to pRi;J, deriving it as a
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function of ri and r i. Then, we substitute the above pRi;J by the territory strategy
into manufacturers’ profits described as i = ri

QRi;A +Q
R
i;B

and maximize i
with respect to ri, deriving the optimal value of ri. Finally, we substitute ri into
i, yielding the following manufacturers’ profits under this strategy.
First, when the combinations of the strategies are (N, N), the profit of the
manufacturer is 1= (2   d)2. Second, when the strategies are (T, N), the profit
of the manufacturer with Strategy T is
 
4 + 2d   d2 =2  8   5d22, while profit
of the manufacturer with Strategy N is
 
2   d2 (4 + 3d)2 =2  8   5d22. Third,
when the strategies are (T, T), the profit of the manufacturer is (2 + d)
 
2   d2 =
(2   d)  4   d   2d22. Note that
(2 + d)
 
2   d2
(2   d) (4   d   2d2)2 >
 
2   d2 (4 + 3d)2
2 (8   5d2)2
holds if d > 0:972 and 
4 + 2d   d2
2 (8   5d2)2 >
1
(2   d)2
holds if d > 0:912. Therefore, the strategies that constitute the SPNE are listed
as in this lemma. 
Proof of Observation 3.1. We derive an subgame perfect equilibrium that is an
optimal pricing strategy in Stages 2 and 3 under each of the 52 = 25 dierent
supply chain strategies determined by the twomanufacturers in Stage 1. Within
the following parentheses, the first letter represents the strategy selected by
Manufacturer 1 and the latter represents the strategy selected by Manufacturer
2. For example, (RT, RDN) means that Manufacturer 1 distributes products
using only the retail channel and adopts exclusive territories in its retail channel,
while Manufacturer 2 distributes products using both the retail and the direct
channels and does not adopt exclusive territories.
Case (1): Strategy (RT, RT)
Because both manufacturers adopt exclusive territories and distribute prod-
ucts only in the retail channel,QRi;J = qi j;J holds. Substituting these into Equation
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(3.8), we have
q1 j;J =
1   d   pR1;J + dpR2;J
1   d2 ; (3.20)
q2 j;J =
1   d   pR2;J + dpR1;J
1   d2 : (3.21)
The profits of the retailers in Stage 3 from Equation (3.7) are stated as
1 j =

pR1;J   r1

q1 j;J =

pR1;J   r1
 
1   d   pR1;J + dpR2;J

1   d2 ;
2 j =

pR2;J   r2

q2 j;J =

pR2;J   r2
 
1   d   pR2;J + dpR1;J

1   d2 :
Solving @1 j=@pR1;J = @2 j=@p
R
2;J = 0 to maximize the retailers’ profits yields the
following prices:
pR1;J =
(1   d) (2 + d) + 2r1 + dr2
4   d2 ; (3.22)
pR2;J =
(1   d) (2 + d) + 2r2 + dr1
4   d2 : (3.23)
Here, all the second-order conditions are satisfied in themaximization prob-
lems in the Appendix, since all the profit functions are concave and quadratic
with respect to a price. To ensure concavity exists, we henceforth omit the
second-order conditions.
Substituting Equations (3.20) and (3.21) into Equation (3.4), we restate the
profits of the two manufacturers as
1 = r1
 
q1a;A + q1b;B

= r1
0BBBB@1   d   pR1;A + dpR2;A1   d2 + 1   d   p
R
1;B + dp
R
2;B
1   d2
1CCCCA ; (3.24)
2 = r2
 
q2a;A + q2b;B

= r2
0BBBB@1   d   pR2;A + dpR1;A1   d2 + 1   d   p
R
2;B + dp
R
1;B
1   d2
1CCCCA : (3.25)
Substituting Equations (3.22) and (3.23) into Equations (3.24) and (3.25) and
maximizing them with respect to each wholesale price by solving @1=@r1 =
@2=@r2 = 0 in Stage 2 yields
r1 = r2 =
(1   d) (2 + d)
4   d   2d2 : (3.26)
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Re-evaluating Equations (3.24) and (3.25) using Equations (3.22), (3.23), and
(3.26) yields the equilibrium profits in this case.
Case (2): Strategy (RN, RT)
In Stage 3, each of the four retailers determines its retail price; that is,
Retailer i j determines pRi;J. Because Retailers 1a and 1b sell the identical products
of brand 1 supplied by Manufacturer 1, it sells the brand 1’s products through
the retail channel without exclusive territories. Hence, the only combination of
the retail prices set by Retailers 1a and 1b that constitutes a Nash equilibrium
is: pR1;A = p
R
1;B = r1 In general, if a manufacturer chooses strategy RN or RDN,
pRi;A = p
R
i;B = ri holds. Substituting this equation and Q
R
2;J = q2 j;J into Equation
(3.8), we have the following demand functions:
QR1;J = q1a;J + q1b;J =
1   d   r1 + dpR2;J
1   d2 ; (3.27)
q2 j;J =
1   d   pR2;J + dr1
1   d2 : (3.28)
In Stage 3, Retailer 2 j also maximizes its profit. From Equation (3.7), the profit
of Retailer 2 j is
2 j =

pR2;J   r2

q2 j;J =

pR2;J   r2
 
1   d   pR2;J + dr1

1   d2 :
To maximize the profit, we solve @2 j=@pR2;J = 0 and obtain
pR2;J =
1   d + r1 + dr2
2
: (3.29)
Substituting Equations (3.27) and (3.28) into Equation (3.4), we yield the follow-
ing manufacturers’ profits as the function of retail prices:
1 = r1

QR1;A +Q
R
1;B

= r1
0BBBB@1   d   r1 + dpR2;A1   d2 + 1   d   r1 + dp
R
2;B
1   d2
1CCCCA ; (3.30)
2 = r2
 
q2a;A + q2b;B

= r2
0BBBB@1   d   pR2;A + dr11   d2 + 1   d   p
R
2;A + dr1
1   d2
1CCCCA : (3.31)
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In Stage 2, each manufacturer maximizes its profit by substituting Equation
(3.29) into Equations (3.30) and (3.31). Solving the first-order condition of
@1=@r1 = @2=@r2 = 0, we have
r1 =
4   d   3d2
8   5d2 ; (3.32)
r2 =
4   2d   3d2 + d3
8   5d2 : (3.33)
Plugging Equations (3.29), (3.32), and (3.33) into Equations (3.30) and (3.31), we
yield the equilibrium profits in this case.
Case (3): Strategy (RDT, RT)
Because Manufacturers 1 and 2 adopt exclusive territories in their retail
channels, QRi;J = qi j;J holds. From this equation and Equations (3.14), (3.15), and
(3.16), we have
q1 j;J =
(1   d) (1   t) (1   dt)    1   d2t2 pR1;J +  1   d2 tpD1;J + d  1   t2 pR2;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) ;
(3.34)
QD1;J =
1   t   pD1;J + tpR1;J
1   t2 ; (3.35)
q2 j;J =
1   d   pR2;J + dpR1;J
1   d2 : (3.36)
The profits of Manufacturer 1 and the retailers in Stage 3 can be stated using
Equations (3.6) and (3.7) as
1 = r1
 
q1a;A + q1b;B

+ pD1;AQ
D
1;A + p
D
1;BQ
D
1;B; (3.37)
1 j =

pR1;J   r1

q1 j;J; (3.38)
2 j =

pR2;J   r2

q2 j;J: (3.39)
Inserting Equations (3.34), (3.35), and (3.36) into Equations (3.37), (3.38), and
(3.39), we obtain the profits as functions of retail prices. Further, maximizing
each profit by solving @1=@pD1;J = @1 j=@p
R
1;J = @2 j=@p
R
2;J = 0, we have the
retail prices as the functions of the wholesale prices (r1, r2). We substitute
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these retail prices into Equations (3.34), (3.35), and (3.36), obtaining the demand
in the respective markets as the functions of the two wholesale prices. We
then substitute these retail prices and demand levels as the function of the
wholesale prices into the manufacturers’ profits of 1 and 2. Finally, we
maximize the manufacturers’ profits by solving @1=@r1 = @2=@r2 = 0, having
the equilibrium wholesale prices of r1 and r2. Substituting these equilibrium
wholesale prices into 1 and 2 yields the equilibrium profits in this case.
Case (4): Strategy (RDN, RT)
Because Manufacturer 1 does not adopt exclusive territories, pR1;A = p
R
1;B = r1
holds in Stage 3 as a result of the price competition between the two retailers that
deal in the product supplied by the manufacturer. Substituting this equation
and QR2;J = q2 j; J into Equations (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16) gives
QR1;J =
(1   d) (1   t) (1   dt)    1   d2t2 r1 +  1   d2 tpD1;J + d  1   t2 pR2;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) ; (3.40)
QD1;J =
1   t   pD1;J + tr1
1   t2 ; (3.41)
q2 j;J =
1   d   pR2;J + dr1
1   d2 : (3.42)
The profits of Manufacturer 1 and the two retailers that deal in Manufacturer
2’s product in Stage 3 are stated based on Equations (3.6) and (3.7) as
1 = r1

QR1;A +Q
R
1;B

+ pD1;AQ
D
1;A + p
D
1;BQ
D
1;B; (3.43)
2 j =

pR2;J   r2

q2 j;J: (3.44)
Substituting Equations (3.40), (3.41), and (3.42) into Equations (3.43) and (3.44),
we state the profits as the functions of the retail prices. Tomaximize each profit,
we solve @1=@pD1;J = @2 j=@p
R
2;J = 0, obtaining
pD1;J =
1   t + 2tr1
2
; (3.45)
pR2;J =
1   d + dr1 + r2
2
: (3.46)
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Substituting Equations (3.45) and (3.46) into Equations (3.40), (3.41), and (3.42),
we state the demand as the functions of the wholesale prices of r1 and r2. We
further substitute these demand levels into Equations (3.4) and (3.43), yielding
the manufacturers’ profits as the functions of the wholesale prices. Lastly, we
maximize the profits of the manufacturers by solving @1=@r1 = @2=@r2 = 0,
yielding
r1 =
4   d   3d2
8   5d2 ; (3.47)
r2 =
4   2d   3d2 + d3
8   5d2 : (3.48)
Replacing the wholesale prices in the profits of the manufacturers with Equa-
tions (3.47) and (3.48) yields the equilibrium profits in this case.
Case (5): Strategy (D, RT)
Because Manufacturer 2 adopts exclusive territories QR2;J = q2 j;J holds. From
this and Equations (3.10) and (3.11), the demand levels are described as
QD1;J =
1   dt   pD1;J + dtpR2;J
1   d2t2 ; (3.49)
q2 j;J =
1   dt   pR2;J + dtpD1;J
1   d2t2 : (3.50)
The profits of Manufacturer 1 and the retailers handling the products from
Manufacturer 2 in Stage 3 are
1 = pD1;AQ
D
1;A + p
D
1;BQ
D
1;B; (3.51)
2 j =

pR2;J   r2

q2 j;J: (3.52)
Substituting Equations (3.49) and (3.50) into Equations (3.51) and (3.52), we
describe the profits as the functions of the retail prices. The maximization of
the profits by solving @1=@pD1;J = @2 j=@p
R
2;J = 0 yields
pD1;J =
(1   dt) (2 + dt) + dtr2
4   d2t2 ; (3.53)
pR2;J =
(1   dt) (2 + dt) + 2r2
4   d2t2 : (3.54)
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Inserting Equations (3.53) and (3.54) into Equation (3.50) provides the demand
for q2 j;J as the function of the wholesale price, r2. We substitute this demand
into the following profit of Manufacturer 2:
2 = r2
 
q2a;A + q2b;B

(3.55)
Finally, Manufacturer 2 maximizes Equation (3.55) with respect to r2 by solving
@2=@r2 = 0, yielding
r2 =
(1   dt) (2 + dt)
2 (2   d2t2) : (3.56)
Substituting Equation (3.56) into Equations (3.51), and (3.55) provides the equi-
librium profits of the manufacturers.
Case (6): Strategy (RT, RN)
This case is the opposite of Case (2): Strategy (RN, RT) in terms of man-
ufacturers’ strategies, and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits at equilib-
rium derived in Case (2) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (7): Strategy (RN, RN)
Because neither manufacturer adopts exclusive territories, pRi;A = p
R
i;B = ri
holds as a Nash equilibrium in Stage 3 as a result of the price competition
between the two retailers that deal in the same brand. Substituting this into
Equation (3.8) provides
QRi;J =
1   d   ri + dr i
1   d2 : (3.57)
Substituting Equation (3.57) into Equation (3.4) yields
1 = r1

QR1;A +Q
R
1;B

= 2r1
1   d   r1 + dr2
1   d2 ; (3.58)
2 = r2

QR2;A +Q
R
2;B

= 2r2
1   d   r2 + dr1
1   d2 : (3.59)
Each manufacturer maximizes its profit by solving @1=@r1 = @2=@r2 = 0,
giving
r1 = r2 =
1   d
2   d : (3.60)
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Inserting Equation (3.60) into Equations (3.58) and (3.59) yields the equilibrium
profits of the manufacturers.
Case (8): Strategy (RDT, RN)
Because Manufacturer 2 does not adopt exclusive territories, pR2;A = p
R
2;B = r2
holds as a Nash equilibrium in Stage 3. Using this relationship and QR1;J = q1 j;J,
Equations (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16) provide the following demands:
q1 j;J =
(1   d) (1   t) (1   dt)    1   d2t2 pR1;J +  1   d2 tpD1;J + d  1   t2 r2
(1   d2) (1   t2) ; (3.61)
QD1;J =
1   t   pD1;J + tpR1;J
1   t2 ; (3.62)
q2 j;J =
1   d   r2 + dpR1;J
1   d2 : (3.63)
The profits of Manufacturer 1 and the retailers handling the products from
Manufacturer 1 in Stage 3 are
1 = r1
 
q1a;A + q1b;B

+ pD1;AQ
D
1;A + p
D
1;BQ
D
1;B; (3.64)
1 j =

pR1;J   r1

q1 j;J: (3.65)
Substituting Equations (3.61), (3.62), and (3.64) into Equations (3.64) and (3.65),
we describe the profits as the functions of the retail prices. The maximization
of the profits by solving @1=@pD1;J = @1 j=@p
R
1;J = 0 yields the retail prices as the
functions of thewholesale prices of r1 and r2. We substitute these into Equations
(3.61), (3.62), and (3.64) and obtain the demand levels qi j;J, QD1;J, and Q
R
2;J as the
functions of the wholesale prices. We substitute these into Equations (3.64) and
(3.65), having manufacturers’ profits as the functions of the wholesale prices.
Finally, the manufacturers maximize respective profits by solving @1=@r1 =
@2=@r2 = 0, yielding the equilibriumwholesale prices of r1 and r2. Substituting
all these into Equations (3.64) and (3.65) provides the equilibrium profits of the
manufacturers.
Case (9): Strategy (RDN, RN)
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Because neither manufacturer adopts exclusive territories, pRi;A = p
R
i;B = ri
holds as a Nash equilibrium in Stage 3 as a result of the price competition
between the two retailers that deal in the same brand. Substituting this into
Equations (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16) provides
q1 j;J =
(1   d) (1   t) (1   dt)    1   d2t2 r1 +  1   d2 tpD1;J + d  1   t2 r2
(1   d2) (1   t2) ; (3.66)
QD1;J =
1   t   pD1;J + tr1
1   t2 ; (3.67)
q2 j;J =
1   d   r2 + dr1
1   d2 : (3.68)
Based on Equation (3.6), the profit of Manufacturer 1 in Stage 3 is stated as
1 = r1

QR1;A +Q
R
1;B

+ pD1;AQ
D
1;A + p
D
1;BQ
D
1;B: (3.69)
Substituting Equations (3.66) and (3.67) into Equation (3.69), we describe the
profits of Manufacturer 1 as the functions of the wholesale and retail prices.
The maximization of the profit by solving @1=@pD1;J = 0 yields
pD1;J =
1   t + 2tr1
2
: (3.70)
We substitute Equation (3.70) into Equations (3.66), (3.67), and (3.68) and obtain
the demand levels as the functions of the wholesale prices. We then substitute
these demand levels into Equations (3.4) and (3.69), yielding the profits of
Manufacturers 1 and 2 as the functions of the wholesale prices. Finally, we
maximize the profits of the manufacturers by solving @1=@r1 = @2=@r2 = 0,
having
r1 = r2 =
1   d
2   d : (3.71)
Inserting Equation (3.71) into Equations (3.4) and (3.69) yields the equilibrium
profits of the manufacturers.
Case (10): Strategy (D, RN)
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Because Manufacturer 2 does not adopt exclusive territories, pR2;A = p
R
2;B = r2
holds as aNash equilibrium inStage 3. Substituting this equation intoEquations
(3.10) and (3.11) provides
QD1;J =
1   dt   pD1;J + dtr2
1   d2t2 ; (3.72)
QRi;J =
1   dt   r2 + dtpD1;J
1   d2t2 : (3.73)
Based on Equation (3.5), the profit of Manufacturer 1 in Stage 3 is
1 = pD1;AQ
D
1;A + p
D
1;BQ
D
1;B: (3.74)
Substituting Equation (3.72) into Equation (3.74) provides the profit of Manu-
facturer 1 as the functions of the wholesale and retail prices. The maximization
of the profit by solving @1=@pD1;J = 0 yields
pD1;J =
1   t + 2tr2
2
: (3.75)
We substitute Equation (3.75) into Equation (3.73), obtaining the demand for
QR2;J as the function of the wholesale price. We further substitute these into
Equation (3.4), yielding the profit in Stage 2 as the function of the wholesale
price. Finally, wemaximize the profit ofManufacturer 2 by solving @2=@r2 = 0,
having
r2 =
(1   dt) (2 + dt)
2 (2   d2t2) : (3.76)
Inserting Equation (3.76) into Equations (3.4), (3.72), (3.73), (3.74), and (3.75)
yields the equilibrium profits for the manufacturers.
Case (11): Strategy (RT, RDT)
This case is the opposite of Case (3): Strategy (RDT, RT) in terms of man-
ufacturers’ strategies, and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits at equilib-
rium derived in Case (3) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
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Case (12): Strategy (RN, RDT)
This case is the opposite of Case (8): Strategy (RDT, RN) in terms of man-
ufacturers’ strategies, and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits at equilib-
rium derived in Case (8) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (13): Strategy (RDT, RDT)
Because both manufacturers adopt exclusive territories, QRi;J = qi j;J holds.
Using this relationship and Equations (3.12) and (3.13), we have
qi j;J =
(1   d) (1   t)   pRi;J + tpDi;J + dpR i;J + dtpD i;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) ; (3.77)
QDi;J =
(1   d) (1   t)   pDi;J + tpRi;J + dpD i;J + dtpR i;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) : (3.78)
The profit of the manufacturers and retailers in Stage 3 are stated as
i = ri
 
qia;A + qib;B

+ pDi;AQ
D
i;A + p
D
i;BQ
D
i;B; (3.79)
i j =

pRi;J   r1

qi j;J: (3.80)
We first insert Equations (3.77) and (3.78) into Equations (3.79) and (3.80) to
have the profits as the functions of the retail and wholesale prices. Then,
we maximize the profits by solving @i=@pDi;J = @i j=@p
R
i;J = 0 and yield the
retail prices as the functions of the wholesale prices. Next, we substitute these
retail prices into Equations (3.77) and (3.78) to yield demands as the functions
of wholesale prices. We further substitute these demand levels into Equation
(3.79), havingmanufacturers’ profits in Stage 2 as the functions of the wholesale
prices. Lastly, we maximize the profits by solving @i=@ri = 0, which provides
the equilibriumwholesale prices. Substituting these into Equation (3.79) yields
the equilibrium profits of the manufacturers.
Case (14): Strategy (RDN, RDT)
Because Manufacturer 1 does not adopt exclusive territories, pR1;A = p
R
1;B = r1
holds as a Nash equilibrium in Stage 3. Meanwhile, because Manufacturer 2
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adopts exclusive territories, QR2;J = q2 j;J holds. Substituting these relationships
into Equations (3.12) and (3.13) provides
QR1;J =
(1   d) (1   t)   r1 + tpD1;J + dpR2;J + dtpD2;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) ; (3.81)
q2 j;J =
(1   d) (1   t)   pR2;J + tpD2;J + dr1 + dtpD1;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) ; (3.82)
QD1;J =
(1   d) (1   t)   pD1;J + tr1 + dpD2;J + dtpR2;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) ; (3.83)
QD2;J =
(1   d) (1   t)   pD2;J + tpR2;J + dpD1;J + dtr1
(1   d2) (1   t2) : (3.84)
Given the demand functions, the profits of the manufacturers and retailers in
Stage 3 are stated as
1 = r1

QR1;A +Q
R
1;B

+ pD1;AQ
D
1;A + p
D
1;BQ
D
1;B; (3.85)
2 = r2
 
q2a;A + q2b;B

+ pD2;AQ
D
2;A + p
D
2;BQ
D
2;B; (3.86)
2 j =

pR2;J   r2

q2 j;J: (3.87)
Substituting Equations (3.81), (3.82), (3.83), and (3.84) into Equations (3.85),
(3.86), and (3.87) provides the profits as the functions of the wholesale and re-
tail prices. The maximization of the profits by solving @1=@pD1;J = @2=@p
D
2;J =
@2 j=@pR2;J = 0 yields the retail prices as the functions of the wholesale prices.
Then, we substitute these retail prices into Equations (3.81), (3.82), (3.83), and
(3.84), yielding the demand levels as the functions ofwholesale prices. Inserting
these retail prices and demand levels into Equations (3.85) and (3.86) provides
the manufacturers’ profits as the functions of the wholesale prices. Finally, we
maximize the profits by solving @1=@r1 = @2=@r2 = 0, obtaining the equilib-
rium wholesale prices. We derive the equilibrium profits of the manufacturers
by further substituting the equilibrium wholesale prices into the profits of the
manufacturers above.
Case (15): Strategy (D, RDT)
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BecauseManufacturer 2 adopts exclusive territories,QR2;J = q2 j;J holds. Based
on this relationship and Equations (3.17), (3.18), and (3.19), we have the follow-
ing demand levels:
QD1;J =
1   d   pD1;J + dpD2;J
1   d2 ; (3.88)
q2 j;J =
1   t   pR2;J + tpD2;J
1   t2 ; (3.89)
QD2;J =
(1   d) (1   t) (1   dt)    1   d2t2 pD2;J +  1   d2 tpR2;J + d  1   t2 pD1;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) :
(3.90)
The profits of Manufacturer 1 and the retailers in Stage 3 are stated as
1 = pD1;AQ
D
1;A + p
D
1;BQ
D
1;B; (3.91)
2 = r2
 
q2a;A + q2b;B

+ pD2;AQ
D
2;A + p
D
2;BQ
D
2;B; (3.92)
2 j =

pR2;J   r2

q2 j;J: (3.93)
Inserting Equations (3.88), (3.89), and (3.90) into Equations (3.91), (3.92), and
(3.93), we obtain the profits as functions of the retail prices. We then maximize
the profits by solving @1=@pD1;J = @2=@p
D
2;J = @2 j=@p
R
2;J = 0, providing the
retail prices as the functions of the wholesale prices. We substitute these retail
prices into Equations(3.89) and (3.90) to obtaining the demand levels as the
functions of the two wholesale prices. We next substitute these prices and
demand levels into Equation (3.92), yielding the profit of Manufacturer 2 as
the function of the wholesale prices in Stage 2. Finally, we maximize the profit
by solving @2=@r2 = 0, with an equilibrium wholesale price of r2. We obtain
the equilibrium profits of the manufacturers by substituting the equilibrium
wholesale price into the manufacturers’ profits.
Case (16): Strategy (RT, RDN)
This case is the opposite of Case (4): Strategy (RDN, RT) in terms of man-
ufacturers’ strategies, and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
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equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits at equilib-
rium derived in Case (4) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (17): Strategy (RN, RDN)
This case is the opposite of Case (9): Strategy (RDN, RN) in terms of man-
ufacturers’ strategies, and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits at equilib-
rium derived in Case (9) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (18): Strategy (RDT, RDN)
This case is the opposite of Case (14): Strategy (RDN, RDT) in terms of
manufacturers’ strategies, and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore,
the equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits at equi-
librium derived in Case (14) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (19): Strategy (RDN, RDN)
Because neither manufacturer adopts exclusive territories, pRi;A = p
R
i;B = ri
holds as a Nash equilibrium in Stage 3 as a result of the price competition
between the two retailers that deal in the same brand. Substituting this into
Equations (3.12) and (3.13) provides
QRi;J =
(1   d) (1   t)   ri + tpDi;J + dr i + dtpD i;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) ; (3.94)
QDi;J =
(1   d) (1   t)   pDi;J + tri + dpD i;J + dtr i
(1   d2) (1   t2) : (3.95)
From Equation (3.6), the profit of the manufacturers and retailers in Stage 3 are
stated as
i = ri

QRi;A +Q
R
i;B

+ pDi;AQ
D
i;A + p
D
i;BQ
D
i;B: (3.96)
We insert Equations (3.94) and (3.95) into Equation (3.96) to describe the profits
as the functions of the retail and wholesale prices. Then, we maximize the
profits by solving @1=@pD1;J = @2=@p
D
2;J = 0, yielding
pDi;J =
(1   d) (1   t) + (2   d) tri
2   d : (3.97)
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We substitute Equation (3.97) into Equations (3.94) and (3.95), obtaining the
demand for QRi;J and Q
D
i;J as the function of the wholesale price. We further
substitute these into Equation (3.96), yielding the profit in stage 2 as the function
of the wholesale price. Finally, we maximize the profit of Manufacturer 2 by
solving @1=@r1 = @2=@r2 = 0, having
r1 = r2 =
1   d
2   d : (3.98)
Plugging Equation (3.98) into the manufacturers’ profits above, we yield the
equilibrium profits.
Case (20): Strategy (D, RDN)
Because Manufacturer 2 does not adopt exclusive territories, pR2;A = p
R
2;B = r2
holds as aNash equilibrium inStage 3. Substituting this equation intoEquations
(3.17), (3.18), and (3.19) provides
QD1;J =
1   d   pD1;J + dpD2;J
1   d2 ; (3.99)
QR2;J =
1   t   r2 + tpD2;J
1   t2 ; (3.100)
QD2;J =
(1   d) (1   t) (1   dt)    1   d2t2 pD2;J +  1   d2 tr2 + d  1   t2 pD1;J
(1   d2) (1   t2) :
(3.101)
Using Equations (3.5) and (3.6), we state the profits of the manufacturers as
1 = pD1;AQ
D
1;A + p
D
1;BQ
D
1;B; (3.102)
2 = r2

QR2;A +Q
R
2;B

+ pD2;AQ
D
2;A + p
D
2;BQ
D
2;B: (3.103)
Substituting Equations (3.99), (3.100), and (3.100) into Equations (3.102) and
(3.103), we describe the profits of the manufacturers as the functions of the
retail prices. Themaximizationof theprofit by solving@1=@pD1;J = @2=@p
D
2;J = 0
yields the retail price as the function of the wholesale price. We insert the retail
price into Equations (3.99) and (3.100), describing the demand levels as the
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functions of the wholesale prices. Substituting this into Equation (3.103), we
have the profit of Manufacturer 2 as the function of the wholesale price. We
maximize this profit by solving @2=@r2 = 0, with the equilibrium wholesale
price of r2. Finally, we substitute the equilibriumwholesale price into the profits
of manufacturers, yielding the equilibrium profits.
Case (21): Strategy (RT, D)
This case is the opposite of Case (5): Strategy (D, RT) in terms of manu-
facturers’ strategies, and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits at equilib-
rium derived in Case (5) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (22): Strategy (RN, D)
This case is the opposite of Case (10): Strategy (D, RN) in terms of man-
ufacturers’ strategies, and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits at equilib-
rium derived in Case (10) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (23): Strategy (RDT, D)
This case is the opposite of Case (15): Strategy (D, RDT) in terms of man-
ufacturers’ strategies, and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits at equilib-
rium derived in Case (15) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (24): Strategy (RDN, D)
This case is the opposite of Case (20): Strategy (D, RDN) in terms of man-
ufacturers’ strategies, and the manufacturers are symmetrical. Therefore, the
equilibrium profits in this case are given by exchanging the profits at equilib-
rium derived in Case (20) between Manufacturer 1 and Manufacturer 2.
Case (25): Strategy (D, D)
Because each manufacturer uses the direct channel only, the demand is
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written as follows from Equation (3.9):
QDi;J =
1   d   pDi;J + dpD i;J
1   d2 : (3.104)
The profits of the manufacturers in Stage 3 are stated as:
1 = pD1;AQ
D
1;A + p
D
1;BQ
D
1;B; (3.105)
2 = pD2;AQ
D
2;A + p
D
2;BQ
D
2;B: (3.106)
Substituting Equation (3.104) into Equations (3.105) and (3.106), we have the
manufacturers’ profits as the functions of the retail prices. We next maximize
the respective profits by solving @1=@pD1;J = @2=@p
D
2;J = 0, having
pD1;J = p
D
2;J =
1   d
2   d : (3.107)
Inserting Equation (3.107) into Equations (3.104), (3.105), and (3.106) yields
equilibrium profits of the manufacturers. 

4
When should a firm set its selling price to
cope with gray market trade?
4.1 Introduction
Gray market trade, also called parallel trade, means that a product protected
by a copyright, trademark, or patent is sold in one market, and thereafter
legally imported into another market by an entity besides the owner of the
original product rights. In the present world economy, gray market trade
prevails in various consumer products, including clothing, electronic devices,
automobiles, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and beauty goods. Although the
share of gray market trade varies across products and countries, the existence
of a gray market should significantly aect firms’ economic performance. A
report by EFPIA (2016) estimates the size of gray market trade in the EU drug
market in 2014 to be e5,589 million, with the highest market share among EU
countries in Denmark (25%). KPMG (2008) reports that losses due to gray
market trade amount to $58 billion (8% of global sales) in the information
technology industry.
A number of prior studies related to gray market trade have been carried
out, as detailed in Section 4.2. In discussions of gray market trade, not only the
impacts of the tradeon the economic surplus andprofits but alsofirms’ decisions
in the presence of a graymarket trade command significant attention from both
researchers and business practitioners. However, the existing literature neglects
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the question of when a firm that originally produces a product and faces a gray
market should determine its selling price in the gray market, despite this being
an important practical problem for many firms that cope with gray market
activities. Consequently, this study examines the timingproblem forwhenfirms
confronting the gray market should set their selling prices, using an observable
delay game framework developed in game theory studies (e.g., Hamilton and
Slutsky, 1990; van Damme and Hurkens, 1996, 1999, 2004). Specifically, we
consider a situation in which a multinational firm (MNF) produces a specific
product and distributes it in two countries through its own authorized channel
and a parallel importer (PI) buys a some amount of the product in one country
and resells it in the other country through an unauthorized channel. We assume
vertical product dierentiation between the products sold by the MNF and PI
because consumers evaluate a genuine product sold by the MNF through the
authorized channel more highly than a product sold by the PI through the
unauthorized channel. Moreover, we assume that consumers have dierent
preferences for product quality. Our model assumes that the MNF and PI
endogenously choose not only the selling price but also the timing of pricing to
investigate the problem of when these firms should set their selling prices.
The central findings in this chapter are as follows: a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE), in which the MNF and PI set their prices in the gray
market at the same time never occurs and two SPNEs can occur depending on
the degree preference for the product quality of consumers in the market in
which the MNF faces gray market trade. On the one hand, when the dierence
in consumer preference for product quality is small, the MNF always sets its
price sold in the gray market before the PI sets the price. On the other hand,
when the dierence in consumer preference in the market with parallel imports
is large, the MNF sets the price in the gray market after the PI sets its price in
equilibrium. In addition, the MNF can earn a higher profit by setting its price
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later when the dierence is large. These results suggest that the MNF should
change the timing of pricing in a gray market according to the circumstances.
Ourmodel structure is closely related to those of Li (2014) andMatsui (2017)
in that the pricing timing decisions by firms are endogenously determined.
Li (2014) investigates the timing problem when two vertically dierentiated
firms should set their own prices. He shows that a sequential equilibrium (a
high-quality firm sets its price earlier than a low-quality firm) is risk dominant.
Matsui (2017) investigates the timing problem when a manufacturer managing
dual-channel supply chains should set prices. He shows that simultaneousprice
competition between amanufacturer and a retailer never occurs in equilibrium,
and that the manufacturer should post the direct price before or upon, but not
after, setting the wholesale price for the retailer. Our result diers from those of
Li (2014) and Matsui (2017) in that we show that setting a selling price later can
improve the firm’s profit. This result is new and thus contributes to the existing
literature.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the
literature on gray market trade. Section 4.3 presents the basic assumptions and
settings of our economic model. In Section 4.4, we analyze a non-cooperative
gamemodel andderive an SPNEaswell as present the operational implications.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
Many previous studies of gray market trade focus on its impacts on the eco-
nomic surplus and profits, pointing out the various circumstances in which
a complete ban of gray market trade negatively aects economic outcomes.
Bucklin (1993), Malueg and Schwartz (1994), Richardson (2002), Maskus and
Chen (2004), Valletti and Szymanski (2006), and Matsui (2014) focus on the ef-
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fect of gray market trade on the economic surplus. Bucklin (1993) constructs an
economic model to identify the eect of gray market trade. He finds that the
loss from gray market trade is insucient to justify restriction by public agen-
cies, which may complicate supply chain management. Malueg and Schwartz
(1994) point out that gray market trade prevents a manufacturer from price
discrimination for the same goods between markets, but that setting a uniform
price increases the price and thus has the converse eect of damaging social
welfare. Maskus and Chen (2004) theoretically and empirically show that it
is possible to reduce the global social surplus by fully restricting gray market
trade. Richardson (2002), Valletti and Szymanski (2006), andMatsui (2014) also
show that gray market trade has positive impacts on the social surplus.
Studies that focus on manufacturers’ profits overall indicate that manufac-
turers should tolerate some level of gray market trade (e.g., Dutta et al., 1994;
Ahmadi and Yang, 2000; Maskus and Chen, 2002; Xiao et al., 2011; Ahmadi et
al., 2015, 2017; Iravani et al., 2016). Ahmadi and Yang (2000) investigate gray
market trade when customers are segmented in an importing country. In their
model, gray market trade works as another channel for genuine products and
creates a third and new segment of consumers who would not have previously
bought this product because of price discrimination. Eventually, gray market
trade may help the original manufacturer expand the global reach of its prod-
uct, thus expanding its global profit. This finding implies that themanufacturer
should permit graymarket trade under some circumstances. Maskus and Chen
(2002) construct an economic model in which gray market trade emerges be-
cause of the incentive problems in vertical distribution. They show that an
original manufacturer does not set a wholesale price that completely prevents
gray market trade in equilibrium, by comparing the trade-o between the de-
crease in demand and limitation of gray market trade by raising its wholesale
price. Xiao et al. (2011) show that a manufacturer can benefit from gray market
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Figure 4.1: Supply chain structure
trade by a third party or authorized dealer, and that both those who benefit
and the mechanism by which this benefit occurs depend on the supply chain
structure of the manufacturer.
4.3 Model and assumptions
This section describes our model and the assumptions used in it. Fig. 4.1 illus-
trates the supply chain structure of our model and Table 4.1 lists the variables
used in our model. As Fig. 4.1 shows, we assume that an MNF manufactures a
specific product and sells it in Counties A and B. In addition, we assume that a
PI buys a certain amount of the product from Country A’s market and resells it
in Country B.
InCountryA, theMNFsells an authorizedproduct. Suppose that the inverse
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Table 4.1: Notation
Notation
 Maximum evaluation of a product for consumers in Country A
 Slope of the inverse demand function in County A
 Preference parameter of consumers in Country B
d Density of consumers inCcountry B
r Maximum evaluation of a product for consumers in Country B
s Quality of product in Country B
pA MNF price in Country A
pMNF MNF price in Country B
pPI PI price in Country B
qA Consumer demand in Country A
qMNF MNF’s selling quantity in Country B
qPI PI’s purchasing quantity in Country A and selling quantity in
Country B
 MNF’s profit
 PI’s profit
tpA Period in which the MNF chooses the price in Country A
tpMNF Period in which the MNF chooses the price in Country B
tpPI Period in which the PI chooses the price in Country B
E Sequence in which the MNF sets the price in Country B earlier
than the PI
S Sequence in which the MNF and PI set the price in Country B
simultaneously
L Sequence in which the MNF sets the price in Country B later
than the PI
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demand function in Country A is
pA =    qA; (4.1)
where pA denotes the price in Country A, qA denotes consumer demand in
Country A, and  and  are positive constants. We may rewrite Equation (4.1)
as the following demand function:
qA =
 
   pA =: (4.2)
In Country B, theMNF sells its genuine product through its own authorized
channel, and the PI sells the product through its unauthorized channel after
purchasing it inCountryA’smarket. We assumevertical product dierentiation
between the products sold by the MNF and PI. Following Shaked and Sutton
(1982), we assume that consumers in Country B have a higher utility from
a product with higher quality than a product with lower quality. Moreover,
we assume that consumers have dierent preferences for product quality. To
capture the dierence in these preferences, we introduce the parameter of  2h
; 
i
 R+ that represents consumer preferences for product quality. We
assume that consumers are distributed uniformly along
h
; 
i
with a density
of d. To ensure that positive demand arises in equilibrium, we assume that  is
suciently large to ensure  > d

   

, and that  and  satisfy the inequality
 < =2. Suppose that the utility functions of consumers in Country B are
uMNF = r   pMNF + sMNF; (4.3)
uPI = r   pPI + sPI; (4.4)
where r is a suciently large positive constant. Henceforth, the subscripts
MNF and PI represent the variables for the MNF and PI, respectively. For
example, pMNF is the price of the product sold by the MNF, while pPI is the price
of the product sold by the PI. Likewise, sMNF and sPI represent the quality of
the products sold by the MNF and PI in Country B, respectively. We assume
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that the quality of the product sold by the PI is lower than that sold by the
MNF, so that sMNF > sPI > 0, and we denote the quality dierence between
the MNF and PI by   sMNF   sPI. Because the consumer is characterized by
, a consumer indierent between the authorized and unauthorized products
satisfies r   pMNF + ˆsMNF = r   pPI + ˆsPI. Solving for ˆ provides
ˆ =
 
pMNF   pPI =: (4.5)
That is, the value of the indierent consumer preference parameter is estab-
lished by the ratio of the price and quality dierences. Consumers with a high
preference parameter value that satisfies  > ˆ buy the product from the MNF,
whereas consumers with a low preference parameter value that satisfies  < ˆ
buy the product from the PI. The demand functions in Country B are
qMNF = d
n
   (pMNF   pPI)=
o
; (4.6)
qPI = d
n
(pMNF   pPI)=   
o
: (4.7)
We next state the firms’ objective functions. The total profits of the MNF
earned in Countries A and B are:
 =
 
pA   c  qA + qPI +  pMNF   c qMNF; (4.8)
where c is the marginal cost, which is assumed to be normalized to 0. On the
contrary, the profit of the PI is
 = (pPI   pA)qPI: (4.9)
Based on these settings, we conceive the observable delay game constructed
by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), which is composed of two stages. In Stage 1,
the MNF and PI simultaneously state the period in which they will set their
prices and are committed to this statement before they actually do so. In Stage
2, following their statements, the MNF and PI set their prices knowing when to
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set its price for each other. Because there are three control variables, pA , pMNF,
and pPI, we suppose that Stage 2 has three periods.
To identify the timing of setting the price, let tpA, tpMNF , and tpPI represent
the timing of the MNF’s pricing in Country A, the timing of the MNF’s pricing
timing inCountryB, and the timingof thePI’s pricing inCountryB, respectively.
Since there are three periods inwhich theMNF and PI set each price, these three
variables can be timings of 1, 2, or 3. In other words, in Stage 1 of the game,
the MNF determines tpA and tpMNF from f1; 2; 3g and the PI determines tpPI from
f1; 2; 3g. Because the PI purchases the product in Country A’s market and then
sells it in Country B, we assume that these timing variables satisfy tpA < tpPI such
that the PI sets its price after observing the price of the product sold by theMNF
in Country A.
4.4 Analysis
Substituting Equations (4.2), (4.6), and (4.7) into Equations (4.8) and (4.9), we
derive the payos for the MNF and PI by the timing strategy in Stage 1 of the
game. Because Stage 2 has three periods in which each of the three control vari-
ables, namely tpA, tpMNF , and tpPI , are set, we need to investigate 33 = 27 sets of the
timing sequence to compute all the possible payos. However, the constraint
tpA < tpPI points out that it is sucient to examine only nine sets of the timing
sequence. Moreover, by computing the equilibrium payos, we find that while
there are nine possible sets of timings, only three case of equilibrium payos
and variables exist. Accordingly, we separate the equilibrium payos and vari-
ables using the term “sequence” for the three prices set. Let Sequences E, S, and
L denote that the MNF sets its price in Country B earlier than, simultaneously,
and later than, the price of the unauthorized product sold by the PI in Country
B, respectively, as Fig. 4.2 illustrates. We define Sequence E as the sequence in
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Figure 4.2: Timeline
Note: The timings E, S, and L shown by the arrows represent when the MNF determines its
price in Country B, pMNF.
which the timing variables are

tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (1; 1; 2), (1; 1; 3), (1; 2; 3), (2; 1; 3), or
(2; 2; 3) because tpMNF < tpPI holds in all these combinations. We define Sequence S
as the sequence inwhich the timing variables are

tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (1; 2; 2), (1; 3; 3),
or (2; 3; 3) because tpMNF = tpPI holds. Finally,wedefineSequenceLas the sequence
inwhich the timing variables are

tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (1; 3; 2) because tpMNF > tpPI holds.
Hereafter, we attach the superscripts E, S, or L to the equilibrium payos and
variables to identify the sequence of timings. The following proposition shows
the equilibrium outcomes by sequence. (The Appendix provides all the proofs.)
Proposition 4.1. The equilibrium values of the payos and endogenous vari-
ables by sequence are as follows. The symbolM is defined asM  +d

   

.
Case (1): Sequence E
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Price Quantity
pEA = M=2 q
E
A =
n
   d

   
o
=
 
2

pEMNF =
n
M + 

2   
o
=2 qEMNF = d

2   

=4
pEPI =
n
2M + 

2   3
o
=4 qEPI = d

2   3

=4
Profit
E = d

2   
 n
M + 

2   
o
=8 +M

2   d

=
 
8

E = d

2   3
2
=16
Case (2): Sequence S
Price Quantity
pSA = M=2 q
S
A =
n
   d

   
o
=
 
2

pSMNF =
n
3M + 2

2   
o
=6 qSMNF = d

2   

=3
pSPI =
n
3M + 2

   2
o
=6 qSPI = d

   2

=3
Profit
S = d

2   
 n
3M + 2

2   
o
=18 +M
n
3   d

   
o
=
 
12

S = d

   2
2
=9
Case (3): Sequence L
Price Quantity
pLA = M=2 q
L
A =
n
   d

   
o
=
 
2

pLMNF =
n
2M + 

3   2
o
=4 qLMNF = d

3   2

=4
pLPI =
n
M + 

   2
o
=2 qLPI = d

   2

=4
Profit
L = d

3   2
 n
2M + 

3   2
o
=16 +M

2   d

=
 
8

L = d

   2
2
=8
By comparing the equilibrium variables in Proposition 4.1, we derive the
following two propositions.
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Proposition 4.2. The equilibrium variables satisfy the following relationships:
pEA = p
S
A = p
L
A
pEMNF > p
L
MNF > p
S
MNF
pEPI > p
L
PI > p
S
PI
qEA = q
S
A = q
L
A
qLMNF > q
S
MNF > q
E
MNF
qEPI > q
S
PI > q
L
PI
Proposition 4.3. The equilibriumprofits satisfy the following relationships clas-
sified depending on the relative degree of the consumer preference parameters
 and ,
Case (a): When 0 <   (2   p2)=2 holds:
E > L > S
L  E  S
Case (b): When (2   p2)=2 <  < =2 holds:
E > L > S
E > L > S
The following corollary is derived from Proposition 4.2.
Corollary 4.1. The equilibrium price dierence in Country B is the largest when
the MNF sets the price in Country B earlier; that is,
pEMNF   pEPI > pSMNF   pSPI > pLMNF   pLPI:
We can identify the optimal timing strategies for the MNF and PI in Stage
1 using the results of Proposition 4.2. For the compliance of the results, we
derive the payo matrix of the timing game in Stage 1 and propose the Nash
equilibrium in the following observation.
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Observation 4.1. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the payo matrix in Stage 1. The
cell in which both payos in parentheses are enclosed by a square constitutes
the Nash equilibrium in the timing game.
We use multiplication signs in the cells in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 to indicate
where the combinations of timing strategies do not satisfy tpA < tpPI . To identify
the optimal timing strategy, we enclose the payo resulting from the optimal
strategies of both firms by a square in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Because the left
variable in parentheses represents the MNF’s payo and the right variable
the PI’s payo, the cell in which the payos in parentheses are enclosed by a
square constitutes the Nash equilibrium in the timing game, as stated in the
observation. We draw the following proposition by referring to Tables 4.2 and
4.3.
Proposition 4.4. The combinations of timings that constitute the SPNE, classi-
fied depending on the relative degree of the consumer preference parameters
of Country B are summarized as follows:
Case (a): When 0 <   (2   p2)=2 holds:
In this case, the combinations of timings that constitute the SPNE are (tpA,
tpMNF , tpPI )=(1; 1; 3) ; (1; 2; 3) ; (2; 1; 3) ; (2; 2; 3) ; or (1; 3; 2). The combination of tim-
ings (1; 3; 2) corresponds to Sequence L and the other combinations correspond
to Sequence E. This suggests that when the lower limit of the consumer prefer-
ence parameter for product quality is relatively small, an equilibrium arises in
which the MNF sets the price in Country B at the last timing.
Case (b): When (2   p2)=2 <  < =2 holds:
In this case, the combinations of timings that constitute the SPNE are (tpA,
tpMNF , tpPI )=(1; 1; 3) ; (1; 2; 3) ; (2; 1; 3) ; (2; 2; 3) ; or (1; 1; 2), all of which correspond to
Sequence E. This suggests that when the lower limit of the consumer preference
parameter for product quality is relatively large, the MNF always sets the price
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Table 4.2: Payomatrix in Case (a)
PI’s timing strategy, tpPI
1 2 3
(1; 1) 

E , E
 
E , E

(1; 2) 

S , S
 
E , E

Timing (1; 3) 

L , L
 
S , S

strategy by (2; 1)  

E , E

MNF on (2; 2)  

E , E

tpA ; tpMNF

(2; 3)  

S , S

(3; 1)   
(3; 2)   
(3; 3)   
Table 4.3: Payomatrix in Case (b)
PI’s timing strategy, tpPI
1 2 3
(1; 1) 

E , E
 
E , E

(1; 2) 

S , S
 
E , E

Timing (1; 3) 

L , L
 
S , S

strategy by (2; 1)  

E , E

MNF on (2; 2)  

E , E

tpA ; tpMNF

(2; 3)  

S , S

(3; 1)   
(3; 2)   
(3; 3)   
Notes: The left variable in parentheses represents the MNF’s payo and the right
variable in parentheses represents the PI’s payo from each combination of timing
strategies. The payo enclosed by a square represents the best response for the MNF
and PI. Hence, the cell in which both the payos in parentheses are enclosed by a
square constitutes the Nash equilibrium. The cells with multiplication signs are the
unrealized combinations of the strategies because tpA < tpPI must hold in this timing
game. See Proposition 4.1 for the payo values, E, S, L, E, S, and L.
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in Country B before the PI sets the price in Country B in equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2 compares the prices and supply levels in equilibrium of each
sequence and points out that the gray market trade volume of Sequence E is
more than that of Sequence L, so that qEPI > q
L
PI. Proposition 4.3 means that
the MNF’s profit in equilibrium of each sequence is maximized in Sequence E
or L depending on the degree of consumer preference parameters for product
quality. Proposition 4.4 is our central finding andhenceprovides themanagerial
implication. It suggests that the optimal timing for the MNF to set its price in
CountryBvarieswith the relativedegreeof the consumerpreferenceparameters
for product quality. Specifically, the lower limit of the consumer preference
parameter for product quality is smaller than the upper limit, so that 0 <  
(2   p2)=2. Hence, it may be optimal for the MNF to set the price in Country
B at the last timing. On the contrary, when the lower limit is relatively large, so
that (2   p2)=2 <  < =2, the MNF should set the price in Country B before
the PI sets its price in Country B. The results from Propositions 4.2 and 4.4 point
out that the MNF should prevent gray market trade by the PI give a the large
dierence of consumer preference parameters for product quality by setting the
price in country B at the last timing, and should not prevent such trade by the
PI in the gray market otherwise by setting the price before the PI’s pricing. In
addition, Proposition 4.3 proposes that the MNF can achieve a higher profit by
setting the price in Country B later given a large dierence in the consumer
preference parameters for product quality. These results imply that the MNF
should change the timing of its pricing in the gray market depending on the
degree of the consumer preference for product quality.
The intuition behind these outcomes is as follows. We assume that con-
sumers in Country B are uniformly distributed in the interval [; ] at density
d. Hence, the relatively small lower limit of the consumer preference parameter
so that Case (a): 0 <   (2  p2)=2 means that the market size of Country B is
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relatively large in addition to that consumers in Country B have high variation
in product quality. By contrast, the relatively large lower limit of the consumer
preference parameter so that Case (b): (2   p2)=2 <  < =2 means that the
market size of Country B is relatively large and that consumers have low varia-
tion in product quality1. Hence, in Case (a), themarket of Country B is relatively
attractive for both firms compared with the market of Country A, while in Case
(b), the market of Country A is relatively attractive compared with the market
of Country B. In our model, since the PI resells the products sold by the MNF
in the market of Country B, theMNF distributes high-quality products through
its own channel and low-quality products through the PI’s channel. In other
words, choosing the timing of setting the price of Country B by the MNF im-
plies choosing which market is important for the MNF and which channels the
MNF oers an advantage in the attractive market. A well-known advantage of
price competition is the second-mover advantage indicated by Gal-Or (1985),
which means a firm that sets pricing later has a higher profit than a firm that
sets pricing earlier. When the dierence in the consumer preference parameter
for product quality in Country B is relatively small (i.e., when the market of
country A is relatively attractive compared with that of country B), the MNF
increases the sales volume in Country A by giving the PI the second-mover
advantage in Country B. On the contrary, when the dierence of consumers
preference parameter for product quality in country B is relatively large (i.e.,
when the market of Country B is relatively attractive compared with that of
Country A), the MNF increases the sales volume in Country B by giving its
own channel the second-mover advantage.
1Although both the dierence in the market size of Country B and the dierence in the
consumer preference aect the results, our model cannot clearly distinguish these eects.
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4.5 Conclusion
This study investigates the problem of timing in terms of price setting for
multinational firms facing gray market trade. The most notable finding from
our analysis is that anmultinational firm that seeks tomaximize its profit should
determine its price in thepresence of graymarket tradedependingon thedegree
of consumer preferences for product quality. Specifically, when the dierence
in the consumer preference parameter for product quality is relatively small
in a market with parallel imports, the multinational firm should set its price
before a parallel importer sets its price. On the contrary, when the dierence
in the consumer preference parameter for product quality is relatively large in
a market with parallel imports, the multinational firm should set its price after
the parallel importer sets its price. For multinational firms facing the problem
of gray market trade, these results oer notable practical implications.
Appendix
Appendix 4.A Proofs
In these proofs, we assume (i)  > d

   

and (ii)  < =2 to ensure positive
equilibrium demand levels in all markets.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We substitute Equations (4.2), (4.6), and (4.7) into
Equations (4.8) and (4.9) to obtain the profits of the MNF and PI as follows:
 = pA
(
   pA

+ d
pMNF   pPI

  
)
+ pMNFd

   pMNF   pPI


(4.10)
 = (pPI   pA )d
pMNF   pPI

  

(4.11)
We solve this game by backward induction using the sequence of pricing
timing.
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Case (1): When

tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (1; 1; 2), (1; 1; 3), (1; 2; 3), (2; 1; 3), or (2; 2; 3)
At a glance, the sequence of prices varies among these five sequences of
pricing timing and thus brings about dierent results. However, we later prove
that all the sets of these timing strategies lead to the same results according to
the envelope theorem by subdividing this case into three: Cases (1)-(i), (ii), and
(iii).
The PI sets the price in Country B in the last move because tpPI > tpA and
tpPI > tpMNF hold in this case. Using backward induction, the PI maximizes its
profit described as Equation (4.11) with respect to pPI by solving @=@pPI = 0,
which yields
pPI =

pA + pMNF   

=2: (4.12)
Here, all the second-order conditions in this Appendix are satisfied since
all the profit functions are concave and quadratic with respect to the price. To
ensure concavity exists, we henceforth omit the second-order conditions.
Next, we examine the MNF’s choice of the price in Country B. We substitute
Equation (4.12) into Equation (4.10), yielding
=pA
8>><>>:   pA + d

pMNF   pA   

2
9>>=>>;+pMNFd
n
pA   pMNF + 

2   
o
2
: (4.13)
We compute the equilibriumwith each of the three cases, such that theMNF
sets the price in Country B (i) before, (ii) upon, and (iii) after setting the price in
Country A.
Case (1)-(i): When

tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (2; 1; 3)
In this case, the MNF determines the price in Country B before determining
the price in Country A. We maximize Equation (4.13) with respect to pA by
solving @=@pA = 0, yielding
pA =

2dpMNF + 2   d

=
 
2d + 4

: (4.14)
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Subsequently, we place Equation (4.14) into Equation (4.13) and maximize
it with respect to pMNF by solving @=@pMNF = 0, obtaining
pMNF =
n
 + d

   

+ 

2   
o
=2: (4.15)
Replacing pMNF in Equation (4.15) with Equation (4.14), we have
pA =
n
 + d

   
o
=2: (4.16)
Plugging Equations (4.15) and (4.16) into Equation (4.12) yields
pPI =
h
2
n
 + d

   
o
+ 

2   3
i
=4: (4.17)
Case (1)-(ii): When

tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (1; 1; 2), (1; 1; 3) and (2; 2; 3)
In these three combinations, the MNF simultaneously sets the two prices.
Then, we maximize Equation (4.13) with respect to both pA and pMNF by solving
@=@pA = @=@pMNF = 0, obtaining
pA =
n
 + d

   
o
=2;
pMNF =
n
 + d

   

+ 

2   
o
=2: (4.18)
Putting Equation (4.18) into Equation (4.12) yields
pPI =
h
2
n
 + d

   
o
+ 

2   3
i
=4: (4.19)
Case (1)-(iii): When

tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (1; 2; 3)
In this case, the MNF determines the price in Country B after determining
the price in Country A, but before the PI determines the price in Country B. We
maximize Equation (4.13) with respect to pMNF by solving @=@pMNF = 0, which
provides
pMNF =
n
2pA + 

2   
o
=2: (4.20)
Inserting Equation (4.20) into Equation (4.13) andmaximizing it with respect
to pA by solving @=@pA = 0 provides
pA =
n
 + d

   
o
=2: (4.21)
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Plugging Equations (4.20) and (4.21) into Equation (4.12) yields
pPI =
h
2
n
 + d

   
o
+ 

2   3
i
=4: (4.22)
Finally, we insert Equations (4.15)–(4.17) of Case (1)-(i), Equations (4.18)–
(4.19) of Case (1)-(ii), or Equations (4.20)–(4.22) of Case (1)-(iii) into Equations
(4.10) and (4.11), yielding the equilibrium profits of the MNF and PI as
 =d

2   
 n
 + d

   

+ 

2   
o
=8
+
n
 + d

   
o 
   d

=
 
8

;
 =d

2   3
2
=16;
which correspond to E and E in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. The same
equilibrium values in Cases (1)-(i), (ii), and (iii) are derived by the envelope
theorem.
Case (2): When

tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (1; 2; 2), (1; 3; 3), or (2; 3; 3)
Maximizing Equation (4.10) with respect to pMNF and Equation (4.11) with
respect to pPI, that is, @=@pMNF = @=@pPI = 0, yields
pMNF =
n
3pA + 

2   
o
=3;
pPI =
n
3pA + 

   2
o
=3: (4.23)
Substituting Equation (4.23) into Equation (4.10) and maximizing it with
respect to pA by solving @=@pA = 0 yields
pA =
n
 + d

   
o
=2: (4.24)
Lastly, inserting Equations (4.23) and (4.24) into Equations (4.10) and (4.11)
provides the equilibrium profits of the MNF and PI as
 =d

2   
 h
3
n
 + d

   
o
+ 2

2   
i
=18
+
n
 + d

   
o n
3   d

   
o
=
 
12

;
 =d

   2
2
=9;
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which correspond to S and S in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.
Case (3): When

tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (1; 3; 2)
Maximizing Equation (4.10) with respect to pMNF by solving @=@pMNF = 0
yields
pMNF =
n
pA + pPI + 
o
=2: (4.25)
Replacing pMNF in Equation (4.11) with Equation (4.25) and maximizing it
with respect to pPI by solving @=@pPI = 0 yields
pPI =
n
2pA + 

   
o
=2: (4.26)
Inserting Equations (4.25) and (4.26) into Equation (4.10) and maximizing it
with respect to pA by solving @=@pA = 0 provides
pA =
n
 + d

   
o
=2: (4.27)
Finally, substituting Equations (4.25), (4.26), and (4.27) into Equations (4.10)
and (4.11) yields the equilibrium profits of the MNF and PI as
 = d

3   2
 h
2
n
 + d

   
o
+ 

3   2
i
=16
+
n
 + d

   
o 
2   d

=
 
8

 = d

   2
2
=8
which correspond to L and L in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Proposition 4.1 suggests that pEA = p
S
A = p
L
A and q
E
A =
qSA = q
L
A hold. Moreover, the results in Proposition 4.1 prove the following series
86 4. Gray market trade
of inequalities:
pEMNF   pLMNF = =4 > 0
pLMNF   pSMNF = 

   2

=12 > 0
pEPI   pLPI = =4 > 0
pLPI   pSPI = 

   2

=6 > 0
qLMNF   qSMNF = d

   2

=12 > 0
qSMNF   qEMNF = d

2   

=12 > 0
qEPI   qSPI = d

2   

=12 > 0
qSPI   qEPI = d

   2

=12 > 0
The signs of the above inequalities are determined by assuming  < =2. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Using the variables in Proposition 4.1, we obtain the
following series of inequalities:
E   L = 
n
2

   2

+ 2
o
=16 > 0
L   S = 

   2
2
=72 > 0
E  S = 

2   
2
=72 > 0
L  S = 

   2
 
17   10

=144 > 0
E  L = 


2
+ 22   4

=16
8>>>><>>>>:
 0 if 0 <   (2   p2)=2
> 0 if (2   p2)=2 <  < =2
The signs of the above inequalities are determined assuming  < =2. 
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Table 4.2 suggests that the combinations of timing
strategies that constitute the SPNE in Case (a) when the dierence in con-
sumer preferences for product quality in Country B is relatively large are
tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (1; 1; 3), (1; 2; 3), (2; 1; 3), (2; 2; 3), or (1; 3; 2). In the combination of
timing strategy

tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (1; 3; 2), the relationship of tpA < tpPI < tpMNF proves
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the existence of an equilibrium in which the MNF sets the price in Country B in
the last timing.
Table 4.3 suggests that the combination of timing strategies that constitute
the SPNE in Case (b) when the dierence in consumer preferences for product
quality in Country B is relatively small are

tpA ; tpMNF ; tpPI

= (1; 1; 3), (1; 2; 3),
(2; 1; 3), (2; 2; 3), or (1; 1; 2). The relationship of tpMNF < tpPI in the five combinations
proves the existence of an equilibrium in which the MNF sets the price in
Country B before the PI sets the price in Country B. 
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